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ABSTRACT 
World food production is growing at a faster rate than population growth and per capita 
food energy has increased in developing countries. However, approximately 800 million 
people in the developing world still do not have access to sufficient food for an adequate diet. 
An additional quarter of a billion people periodically face food inaccessibility due to weather, 
instability in prices and employment, drought, diseases and civil strife. Furthermore, the 
distribution of food is uneven around the world. 
There have been a number of theses advanced on why millions of people around the 
world go hungry including poverty, rapid population and urban growth, uneven distribution 
of food, inadequate domestic agricultural production, trade barriers and inappropriate 
macroeconomic policies leading to negative or slow economic growth. However, an 
important factor that has not been investigated is the relationship between food insecurity and 
the political institutions in developing countries. 
The objective of this study is to better understand the sources of food security problems 
in developing countries and to explore empirically the strength of selected factors in 
explaining the underlying reasons for food security problems. The study provides an 
empirical analysis of the causes of chronic food insecurity including the much ignored 
political, civil and economic freedoms. A cross-sectional econometric model is used with 
data from 153 developed and developing countries for the period 1995. 
The empirical analysis assesses the relative importance of the factors hypothesized to 
explain the differences among countries for a widely used indicator of food insecurity. The 
indicator of food insecurity, per capita dietary energy supply, is regressed on selected 
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economic variables including measures of political rights and civil liberties, and economic 
freedom. The results show that political rights and civil liberties impact food security in 
developing countries indirectly through income. Countries that enjoy political and civil 
freedoms tend to enjoy higher incomes and in turn, are more food-secure than countries 
where these freedoms are repressed. These results suggest that the institutions of developing 
countries, which underlie these rights or freedoms, are critical in the design of interventions 
to alleviate poverty and therefore, food insecurity. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The world food situation appears promising at a first glance. World food production is 
growing at a faster rate than population growth. Food production increased by 2.4 percent 
per annum between 1960 and 1980, although this rate has declined in recent years due to a 
reduction in food production in the developed world. During the 1980s, global grain 
production increased annually by 2.1 percent while population grew by 1.7 percent. Per 
capita food production is approximately 18 percent higher than it was thirty years ago 
(Mitchell and Ingco 1995). Cereal yields have more than doubled during the period from 
1960 to 1990 and real food prices have been declining. Between 1981 and 1985, real world 
prices for cereals fell by 30 percent. Net cereal exports from developing countries increased 
by 80 percent between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s (Mellor 1992). 
In terms of availability of per capita food energy, the increases have amounted to 0.7 
percent per year for developing countries during the 1980s with China and the Far East 
experiencing the greatest increases and Latin America and Africa experiencing the smallest 
increases (Pinstrup-Andersen 1994). The number of developing countries where per capita 
food availability was lower than the sufficient amount of food energy specified by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (about 2200 calories per person 
per day) decreased from 45 countries at the end of the 1970s to 25 countries by the end of the 
1980s (Pinstrup-Andersen 1994). 
However, approximately 800 million people in the developing world still do not have 
access to sufficient food for an adequate diet. An additional quarter of a billion people 
periodically face food inaccessibility due to weather, instability in prices and employment, 
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drought, diseases and civil strife (Tweeten et ai. 1992). Furthermore, the distribution of food 
is uneven around the world. According to the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA 1996), average per capita food consumption is more than 50 percent higher in 
developed countries than in sub-Saharan Africa. 
It is predicted that the world will continue to produce enough food to meet demand and 
that real food prices will continue to decline during the next 25 years. Yet millions of people 
around the world will continue to be malnourished1. Food production in many developing 
countries is unlikely to keep pace with the demands of their growing populations. In the 
developing world, the demand for food in 2025 is expected to be more than double current 
production levels (McCalla 1994). 
A number of reasons have been advanced to explain why millions of people around the 
world go hungry. Scarcity of food is not the sole source of hunger and malnutrition. 
Evidence suggests that even when domestic food availability is high, people in developing 
countries remain at risk because of their inability to acquire food. Rapid population and 
urban growth, uneven distribution of food, inadequate domestic agricultural production, trade 
barriers and inappropriate macroeconomic policies, and natural disasters, war and civil strife 
are cited among the main factors (IDRC 1992). However, poverty is considered to be the 
major cause of food unavailability and food inaccessibility for most of the world's poor. 
According to von Braun (1992), the food problems of the poor are the result of low and 
unstable incomes and a lack of adequate health and sanitation services. Scarcity of land, low 
1 Malnutrition is defined as a nutritional disorder resulting from inadequate nutrition. There are four types of 
malnutrition: ovemutrition, dietary deficiency, secondary malnutrition and undernutrition. Ovemutrition is the result 
of consumption of too many calories; dietary deficiency results from insufficient amounts of essential nutrients in the 
diet; secondary malnutrition occurs when a sick individual is unable to properly digest or absorb some of the food; 
and undernutrition is the result of insufficient calories or protein in the diet required to lead an active healthy life 
(Foster 1992). Malnutrition in developing countries is predominantly undernutrition. 
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investments in human capital, low and declining investments in agricultural research and 
development, absence of productivity-enhancing technology, inadequate infrastructure, poor 
market facilities and high transportation costs have contributed to low labor productivity in 
many rural areas which, in turn, has led to low levels of income. As a result of low 
productivity levels, food producers have become increasingly vulnerable to adverse weather 
conditions, pest infestations, and crop diseases. Marginal lands, environmental degradation 
and the prevalence of subsistence farming have also contributed to low food production, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Christensen et al. 1981). 
Pinstrup-Andersen and Pandya-Lorch (1998) evaluated developments and emerging 
issues in the global food situation that may result in higher risks of food insecurity for 
developing countries in the future. Concerns about food insecurity have been heightened by 
the sharp reduction in global cereal stocks and the anticipated volatility of international 
prices of wheat and maize. The economic crisis facing Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, the reduction in food aid and official development assistance to developing countries, 
and adverse weather patterns affecting agricultural production are among the recent 
developments that are expected to impact global food security. 
Changes in dietary patterns and the increase in demand for livestock products in 
developing countries are among the emerging issues that may exacerbate food insecurity 
problems. Furthermore, lower cereal production in developing countries due to slower 
increases in cereal yields and cultivated areas is expected to result in higher food imports by 
developing countries. Higher production is hindered further by the growing scarcity and 
inefficient use of water, and the declining soil fertility particularly in Africa. Armed conflict 
in developing countries, and the impact of China and India in the global food market are also 
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among the issues that are expected to affect future food security (Pinstrup-Andersen and 
Pandya-Lorch 1998). 
One factor that has not been investigated is the relationship between food insecurity and 
the type of political and/or institutional structure of the developing countries. Studies have 
shown that there is a link between political institutions and economic growth although the 
direction of causality and the sign of the effect have been debated (Deaton 1993). There is 
evidence that the extent of the political power exercised by consumers and producers 
influences decisions on agricultural policies, agricultural research and development 
strategies. Furthermore, the amount of financial support given to a country is sometimes 
affected by its political situation. 
Objective and Organization of the Study 
The objective of this study is to better understand food security problems in developing 
countries and to explore empirically the validity of selected factors in explaining the 
underlying reasons for these food security problems. In particular, the role of political rights, 
civil liberties and economic freedoms in food insecurity will be examined. The aim is to 
show whether political and related institutions must be taken into consideration, particularly 
when economic and development policy decisions are made. The contribution of this study 
is to establish that programs targeting the alleviation of poverty and hunger will likely be 
unsuccessful if implemented in non-democratic or politically restrictive nations with limited 
civil liberties. 
Chapter 2 reviews the concepts and definitions of food security, and presents data on 
the trends in food insecurity in developing countries. A number of definitions for food 
security have been presented by different organizations. Furthermore, food insecurity has 
different dimensions that are also discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 examines the empirical 
evidence on selected factors presented in the literature as the underlying causes of chronic 
food insecurity, and introduces the concepts of political rights and civil liberties as possible 
contributors to food insecurity in developing countries. Chapter 4 details the studies offered 
in the literature on the relationship between political institutions, and civil liberties, and 
economic growth and sets up the link between the underlying institutions and food insecurity. 
Chapter 5 offers a detailed discussion of some of the model variables and a description of the 
data. Chapter 6 presents the econometric model and the empirical results. Chapter 7 
provides the summary and conclusion for the current study. 
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CHAPTER 2. FOOD SECURITY: CONCEPT AND TRENDS 
Concepts and Definitions of Food Security 
Food security: A brief history 
The concept of food security has changed significantly over the past five decades. 
During the early 1940s the concept of food security included "freedom from want" and a 
focus on providing sufficient and secure food supply for all. The 1950s brought about 
bilateral food aid and the disposal of agricultural surplus commodities by developed 
countries in developing countries for purposes of economic development. During the 1960s, 
the concept of food security changed to that of increased food self-sufficiency through 
increased food production in developing countries (Phillips and Taylor 1991). 
A combination of bad weather and crop failure, the energy crisis and the entrance of the 
USSR into world grain markets during the early 1970s led to a dramatic increase in food 
prices and a reduction in grain reserves to their lowest levels in 25 years. As a result, the 
focus of food security turned to food insurance and establishing and maintaining adequate 
national and global food stocks (Phillips and Taylor 1991). 
During the 1980s came the realization that food crises were not necessarily caused by 
drastic shortfalls in food production but by sharp reductions in the purchasing power of the 
poor. National levels of food supplies could be sufficient and malnutrition could still be 
widespread within a country. Special attention to the food crisis in Africa also began during 
that period (Phillips and Taylor 1991). The eradication of hunger and poverty has become a 
priority during the 1990s especially for organizations such as the United Nations and the 
World Bank. These organizations are also attempting to redefine global food security 
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problems to include such issues as women's rights and gender roles (for example, World 
Food Day 1998). 
Definition of food security 
Different organizations have attempted to define food security. However, the various 
definitions are, in substance, very similar (Table 2.1). The most widely used definition of 
food security is offered by the World Bank as "access by all people at all times to enough 
food for an active, healthy life" (World Bank 1986, 1). Household food security is "the 
ability of the household to secure enough food to ensure adequate dietary intake for all its 
members" (von Braun et al. 1992, 6). Although access to food is necessary, it is not a 
sufficient condition for food security. Factors such as health, a sanitary environment and 
health care are also important. The concept of food security also addresses people's risks of 
not having access to the required food. 
The essential elements of food security are the availability of and access to food and the 
risks related to the two. Availability of food is determined mainly by levels and variability of 
food production, stocks and trade. In terms of access to food, poverty is a major determinant 
of chronic household food insecurity. Even with sufficient food supply in domestic markets, 
the poor do not have the means to purchase food. A country's ability to access food from the 
international market is determined by world prices, availability of foreign exchange and, in 
many cases, the supply of food aid. In addition to unavailability of food supplies leading to 
energy deficiencies, food insecurity may also take the form of micronutrient deficiencies 
such as vitamin A and iron (Phillips and Taylor 1991). 
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Table 2.1. Definitions of food security by various organizations 
Orgam7aHon__Definitioç^____ 
World Bank Food security is access by aril people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life. 
Food insecurity, in turn, is the lack of access to enough food. 
Food security is ensuring that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to 
the basic food they need. 
A household is food secure when it has access to the food needed for a healthy life for all its 
members (adequate in terms of quality, safety and culturally acceptable) and when it is not at 
undue risk of losing such access. 
Food security means the assurance of foods to meet the needs of all its members throughout 
each season of the year. Naitional food security means adequate food supplies through local 
production and food imports. Household food security focuses on the family's capacity to 
produce and acquire food. 
Household food security is defined as a goal, operarionalized through a set of principles or 
values that ought to be adhered to in all development measures to ensure access to adequate 
food by and for households over time. 
Food security refers to a country's ability to have stable and reliable access to the food it needs 
through a mixture of production, trade, purchase or barter. The mixture is seen to vary 
according to the resource emdownments of the country and its comparative advantage in 
different types of food, fibre: and industrial production. Food security can also be used at the 
household level and implies stability in access to food through sufficient food self-provisioning 
and/or food purchasing power whatever the season of the year. 
1FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; SCN: United Nations Administrative 
Committee on Coordination - Sub-Committee on Nutrition; UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund; IF AD: 
International Fund for Agricultural Development; UNSTD: United Nations Advisory Committee on Science 
and Technology for Development 
Source: Phillips and Taylor 1991. 
There are different dimensions oif food insecurity: chronic, transitory, short-term and 
long-term and each requires a separate indicator for appropriate measurement. Chronic food 
insecurity is a continuously inadequate diet resulting from persistent inability to acquire 
required food, either in the market or through production. Chronic food insecurity may result 
in increased vulnerability to disease and parasites, productivity losses and misallocation of 
resources due to lower work performance and diminished cognitive ability. This may lead to 
lower output and income thus continuing the cycle of poverty (World Bank 1986; von Braun 
et al. 1992). 
FAO" 
SCN* 
UNICEF® 
IFADa 
UNSTD* 
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Transitory food insecurity results from a temporary decline in the household's ability to 
access enough food due to instability in food prices, food production or incomes. Transitory 
food insecurity can be measured through variables that influence food consumption, namely, 
world and domestic food prices and household purchasing power (World Bank 1986). 
Famine is the most severe form of transitory food insecurity. Food insecurity can be the 
result of man-made and/or natural circumstances and it rarely affects everyone equally 
(Binswanger and Landell-Mills 1995). 
Food security is generally measured at the global, regional, national, household and 
individual levels. Measurements at each level address different concerns. Global, regional 
and national food security can be measured using food demand, supply, and stock and trade 
indicators. At the household level, food security is measured using direct surveys of dietary 
intake and by levels and changes in socioeconomic and demographic variables that indicate 
the status and changes in food security. Anthropometric measurements are also used to 
measure household food security. Individual food insecurity can be measured through the 
incidence of malnutrition, a consequence of deficiencies in protein and micronutrients 
resulting from an inadequate diet and which impair the ability to lead a healthy, active life 
(von Braun et al. 1992). 
Measurements at the individual level are concerned with the impact of food insecurity 
on an individual's health and performance. Measurements of individual household members 
can be aggregated to reach conclusions about national food security. However, 
measurements at the national level cannot be used to indicate the level of household food 
security (Phillips and Taylor 1991). 
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There has been some debate on the appropriate measure or indicator of food insecurity 
and the level at which food security analysis should be targeted (for example, household 
versus national food insecurity). This debate and the results of the analysis in turn have 
different implications for the types of interventions required to alleviate food insecurity. 
Difficulties with definition and measurement of food insecurity, coupled with inadequate 
data, have also affected the estimates of how many individuals are food insecure (von Braun 
1992). 
Different policies are used to reduce chronic and transitory food insecurity. Reduction 
of chronic food insecurity may be achieved by increasing domestic production and/or imports 
or improving market integration to increase the food supply; implementing development 
assistance or income transfer programs targeting the poor, and improving the knowledge of 
the poor in terms of nutritional and health practices. To reduce transitory food insecurity, 
policies need to be directed at stabilizing food supplies and prices as well as helping the poor 
with employment, income transfers or food (Binswanger and Landell-Mills 1995). 
It is important to point out that there is a clear distinction between hunger and food 
security. Hunger, a recurring feature of absolute poverty, can be defined as the "inability to 
eat sufficient food in terms of calories and nutrients to lead a healthy and active life" (Webb 
and von Braun 1994, p. 204). Food security is the absence of hunger and the absence of risk 
relating to adequate food consumption. Food insecurity is the result of a complex 
combination of shortages in the food supply, political and economic disruptions, massive 
income collapse associated with disruptions in the labor or food markets and institutional and 
policy failures (Webb and von Braun 1994). 
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Food security does not necessarily imply food self-sufficiency. Food self-sufficiency is 
the extent to which a nation can meet its food needs from domestic production. There is a 
debate among economists on the benefits of achieving self-sufficiency in food by developing 
countries. A number of developing nations have made food self-sufficiency a priority to 
limit dependence on the world market and vulnerability to food-exporting countries. 
The argument against self-sufficiency is that these countries are not making full use of 
their productive potential if they do not have a comparative advantage in the production of 
food commodities. Proponents of food self-sufficiency argue that developing countries 
export primary agricultural commodities that face declining terms of trade and unstable 
international markets. This makes it difficult for these countries to import food because of 
fluctuating export earnings. Countries that have depended on food imports, whether through 
price distortions (from overvalued exchange rates for example) or food aid, are tempted to 
implement policies that are biased against agriculture and food production (Thomson and 
Metz 1997). It is imperative however that increased food supplies, whether through higher 
domestic production or imports, are accessible to the populations who need more food. 
Food Insecurity Trends in Developing Countries 
Past trends in food insecurity 
A review of global grain production and prices of grains in the world market during the 
last three decades shows a growth rate that has outpaced the growth in population and a 
declining trend in real prices. This is an indication of the availability of food in the world as 
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a whole and is reflected in the 11 percent increase in global per capita dietary energy supply2, 
from 2440 to 2720 kilocalories per day between 1969 and 1992 (FAO 1996). 
However, there has been a global slowdown in the growth of per capita dietary energy 
supply and a decline in per capita dietary energy supply in absolute terms in many parts of 
the world. This has been the result of negative annual economic growth rates in the 
transition countries (Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) and in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a negative growth rate in per capita dietary energy supply 
during the 1970s and 1980s. A high growth in the dietary energy supply was offset by a high 
population growth rate. Per capita dietary energy supply increased in South Asia as a result 
of a decline in population growth and an increase in the growth rate of dietary energy supply 
(FAO 1996). 
Table 2.2 shows the per capita food consumption for the period between the mid-1960s 
to the mid-1990s. Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, per capita food consumption 
increased in all the regions in the world. However, per capita food consumption declined in 
sub-Saharan Africa from 2093 kilocalories per day during the mid-1970s to 2039 kilocalories 
per day during the mid-1990s (the lowest in the world). Sub-Saharan Africa experienced an 
increase in per capita food consumption during the 1995/97 period to 2188 kilocalories per 
day. Per capita food consumption increased in Latin America and the Caribbean from 2543 
kilocalories per day in the mid-1970s to 2685 kilocalories per day during the mid-1980s, and 
it increased to 2791 kilocalories per day by the mid-1990s. 
2 Dietary energy supply is the total food availability estimate provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations. It is obtained by aggregating the energy or nutritive values of the food component of 
commodities available for human consumption. 
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Table 2.2. Per capita food consumption* (kcal/person/day) in developing countries 
Region Period Per capita food consumption 
World 1964/66 2357 
1974/76 2429 
1984/86 2643 
1995/97 2761 
Developing countries 1964/66 2053 
1974/76 2145 
1984/86 2433 
1995/97 2626 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1964/66 2091 
1974/76 2093 
1984/86 2039 
1995/97 2188 
Near East and North Africa 1964/66 2277 
1974/76 2574 
1984/86 2926 
1995/97 2983 
East Asia 1964/66 1953 
1974/76 2094 
1984/86 2544 
1995/97 2783 
South Asia 1964/66 2013 
1974/76 1977 
1984/86 2184 
1995/97 2424 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1964/66 2392 
1974/76 2543 
1984/86 2685 
1995/97 2791 
Industrial countries 1964/66 2945 
1974/76 3065 
1984/86 3218 
1995/97 3374 
Transition countries 1964/66 3222 
1974/76 3385 
1984/86 3378 
1995/97 2901 
a The data is taken from the national Food Balance Sheets and not from consumption surveys. 
Therefore, the per capita food consumption is actually national average apparent food consumption. 
Source: FAO 2000. 
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East Asia and South Asia had the lowest per capita food consumption in the mid-1970s 
(2094 and 1977 kilocalories per day respectively) but this increased to 2783 and 2424 
kilocalories per day respectively by 1995/97. Near East and North Africa had the highest per 
capita food consumption in the developing region in 1995/97 at 2983 kilocalories per day, up 
from 2926 kilocalories per day in the mid-1980s. However, these numbers are well below 
the consumption levels in developed nations where in 1995/97 the per capita food 
consumption averaged approximately 3400 kilocalories per day (FAO 2000). 
The number of undernourished people in the developing world declined from 959 
million during the period 1969/71 to 828 million during the period 1990/92 and finally to 790 
million during the period 1995/97. The proportion of undernourished fell from 37 percent to 
20 percent and then to 18 percent during the same periods. Table 2.3 provides a breakdown 
of the proportion and number of undernourished people by region. It is evident that sub-
Saharan Africa had the highest proportion of undernourished population in the 1990s (33 
percent in 1995/97). 
The number of undernourished increased in sub-Saharan Africa from 88 million in 
1969/71 to 125 million in 1979/81 to 180 million during the period 1995/97. Although East 
Asia had the second highest number of undernourished in 1990/92 (283 million), this number 
declined from 406 million during the period 1979/81 and declined further to 240 million in 
the 1995/97 period. The proportion of undernourished in the region also fell from 29 percent 
to 17 percent between 1979/81 and 1995/97, the largest improvement in the developing 
world. 
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Table 2.3. Incidence of undernourishment in developing countries 
Region Period Percent of population Number of undernourished 
(million) 
Developing countries 1969-71 37 959 
1979-81 29 937 
1990-92 20 828 
1995-97 18 790 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1969-71 34 88 
1979-81 36 125 
1990-92 34 162 
1995-97 33 180 
Near East and North Africa 1969-71 25 45 
1979-81 9 22 
1990-92 8 25 
1995-97 9 33 
East Asia 1969-71 43 504 
1979-81 29 406 
1990-92 17 283 
1995-97 13 240 
South Asia 1969-71 37 267 
1979-81 38 337 
1990-92 26 299 
1995-97 23 284 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1969-71 19 54 
1979-81 13 46 
1990-92 13 59 
1995-97 11 53 
Source: FAO 2000. 
The number of undernourished declined in Near East and North Africa from 45 to 33 
million during the 30-year period between 1969 and 1997, although the number has more 
recently increased when compared to 25 million undernourished in the early 1990s. The 
proportion of undernourished fell from 25 percent to 9 percent during the decade from 1970 
to 1980 but this percentage has not improved significantly since then. In South Asia the 
number and proportion of undernourished increased from 267 to 337 million and from 37 to 
38 percent between 1969 and 1981 respectively. By 1992, the number of undernourished 
decreased to 299 million and the proportion of undernourished declined to 26 percent. 
16 
The mid-1990s saw another improvement in South Asia when the number of 
undernourished declined further to 284 million and the proportion declined to 23 percent. 
Latin America and the Caribbean experienced an overall increase in the number of 
undernourished from 54 to 59 million between 1969 and 1992. The proportion of 
undernourished in the region fell from 19 percent to 13 percent. Although, the number of 
undernourished increased from 46 million to 59 million between 1979 and 1992, the 
proportion remained unchanged at 13 percent. Both the number and proportion of 
undernourished declined in the mid-1990s in Latin America and the Caribbean to 53 million 
and 11 percent respectively when compared to the early 1990s (FAO 2000). 
Sub-Saharan Africa represented 9 percent of the total number of people with inadequate 
food access in the developing world in the early 1970s. This proportion increased to 23 
percent by the mid-1990s. The share of undernourished also increased in Latin America and 
the Caribbean from 6 percent to 7 percent and in South Asia from 28 percent to 36 percent 
during the same period. The share of undernourished people in the developing region 
declined in East Asia and in Near East and North Africa from 53 percent and 5 percent 
during the period 1969-71 to 30 percent and 4 percent during the period 1995/97 respectively 
(FAO 2000). 
According to the FAO (1996), per capita dietary energy supplies in some developing 
countries have reached required levels and thus food inadequacy, or the energy deficiency 
relative to requirement standards, could be eliminated through redistribution efforts. 
However, increases in per capita food supplies are still necessary for the majority of 
developing countries. In the developing world, the undernourished population was 
consuming well below the average per capita energy requirement of approximately 2170 
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kilocalories per day in the early 1990s. The undernourished in sub-Saharan Africa were 
consuming 1470 kilocalories per day, the lowest in the developing region. The 
undernourished were consuming 1580 kilocalories per day in South Asia, 1660 kilocalories 
per day in East and Southeast Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 1640 
kilocalories per day in Near East and North Africa during the same period (FAO 1996). 
Poverty 
In addition to assessing the per capita dietary energy supply, the level and prevalence of 
poverty in many developing countries can be used as another indicator of food insecurity 
since poverty is the basic cause of inaccessibility to food in the developing world. More than 
one-half of the 1.1 billion people living in poverty in developing countries in 1990 lived in 
conditions of extreme poverty. Fifty percent of the poor in the developing world lived in 
South Asia, 15 percent in East Asia, 19 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, and 10 percent in 
Latin America and the Caribbean in 1990. In both South Asia and Africa, 50 percent of the 
population is poor (Pinstrup-Andersen 1994). 
It is projected that there will be significant reductions in poverty in both East and South 
Asia. In sub-Saharan Africa however, the number of poor was estimated to rise to 304 
million by 2000, an increase of almost 50 percent. By the same year, the percentage of the 
developing world's poor who reside in sub-Saharan Africa was predicted to rise from 19 
percent to approximately 33 percent (Pinstrup-Andersen 1994). 
Table 2.4 shows the population living in absolute poverty in developing and transitional 
economies for selected years. Von Braun (1992) defines absolute poverty as the inability of 
individuals to meet basic food and non-food consumption needs to live an active healthy life. 
The absolute poverty rate here is determined by the proportion of people whose income is 
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less than one dollar a day. The measure is based on 1993 purchasing power parities and 
household survey data. 
The figures show that both the share of population and the number of people living in 
poverty increased between 1987 and 1993 before declining significantly by 1998. South 
Asia has the largest number of people living on less than $1 a day, followed by East Asia and 
the Pacific and sub-Saharan Africa. When China is excluded from East Asia and the Pacific, 
sub-Saharan Africa becomes the region with the second largest number of people living in 
absolute poverty. The number of people living in poverty increased in South Asia, sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the transition economies from 1987 to 
1993 and then again from 1993 to 1998. The population living on less that $1 a day declined 
and then rose in the Middle East and North Africa during the same period. 
Table 2.4. People living on less than $1 per day and headcount index in developing and 
transitional economies, selected years, 1987-1998 
Region Population Number of people living on Headcount index 
covered by less than $1 a day (percent) 
at least one (millions) 
survey 1987 1993 1998 1987 1993 1998 
(percent) (est.) (est.) 
East Asia and the Pacific 90.8 417.5 431.9 278.3 26.6 25.2 15.3 
(excluding China) 71.1 114.1 83.5 65.1 23.9 15.9 11.3 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 81.7 1.1 18.3 24.0 0.2 4.0 5.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 88.0 63.7 70.8 78.2 15.3 15.3 15.6 
Middle East and North Africa 52.5 9.3 5.0 5.5 4.3 1.9 1.9 
South Asia 97.9 474.4 505.1 522.0 44.9 42.4 40.0 
Sub-Saharan Afiica 72.9 217.2 273.3 290.9 46.6 49.7 46.3 
Total 88. L 1,183.2 1,304.3 1,198.9 28.3 28.1 24.0 
(excluding China) 84.2 879.8 955.9 985.7 28.5 27.7 26.2 
Source: The World Bank 1999. 
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In terms of the headcount index3, sub-Saharan Africa had the highest percentage of 
population living below the poverty line. However, this percentage declined from 49.7 
percent in 1993 to 46.3 percent in 1998. South Asia had the second highest percentage of 
people living below the poverty line although the figures declined slightly betweenl987 and 
1993 and between 1993 and 1998. The headcount index declined for East Asia and the 
Pacific during the same period. However, the index increased between 1993 and 1998 for 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia and for Latin America and the Caribbean and remained 
unchanged for the Middle East and North Africa. The developing countries and transition 
economies as a whole experienced a declined in the percentage of the population living 
below the poverty line between 1987 and 1998. 
Table 2.5 presents the number of people and the headcount index of people living on 
less than $2 a day in developing and transitional economies. In absolute terms, East Asia and 
the Pacific experienced the most number of people living on less than $2 a day in 1987, 1993 
and 1998. South Asia becomes the region with the largest number of people living on less 
than $2 per day when China is excluded from the East Asia and the Pacific region. This is 
followed by sub-Saharan Africa with 474 million people living on less than $2 a day in 1998. 
The number of people living on less than $2 increased for sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia between 1987 and 
1993 and between 1993 and 1998. The numbers declined for East Asia and the Pacific but 
declined and then increased for the Middle East and North Africa during the same period. 
3 The headcount index is the percentage of the population below the poverty line. 
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Table 2.5. People living on less than $2 per day and headcount index in developing and 
transitional economies, selected years, 1987-1998 
Region Population 
covered by 
at least one 
Number of people living on 
less than $2 a day 
(millions) 
Headcount index 
(percent) 
survey 1987 1993 1998 1987 1993 1998 
(percent) (est) (est.) 
East Asia and the Pacific 90.8 1,052.3 1,035.8 892.2 67.0 60.5 47.1 
(excluding China) 71.1 299.9 271.6 260.1 62.9 51.6 45.0 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 81.7 16.3 79.4 92.9 3.6 17.2 19.9 
Latin America and the Caribbean 88.0 147.6 162.2 182.9 35.5 35.1 36.4 
Middle East and North Afiica 52.5 65.1 61.7 62.4 30.0 24.1 21.9 
South Asia 97.9 911.0 1,017.8 1,095.9 86.3 85.4 84.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 72.9 356.6 427.8 474.8 76.5 77.8 75.6 
Total 88.1 2,549.0 2,784.8 2,801.0 61.0 60.1 56.0 
(excluding China) 84.2 1,796.6 2,020.5 2,168.9 58.2 58.6 57.6 
Source: The World Bank 1999. 
South Asia remains the highest also in terms of the percentage of people below the 
poverty line, although the percentage declined between 1987 and 1998. The headcount index 
declined for East Asia and the Pacific and for the Middle East and North Africa during the 
same period. The index increased for the transition economies and declined but then rose for 
Latin America and the Caribbean between 1987 and 1998. Sub-Saharan Africa experienced 
an increase in the headcount index between 1987 and 1993 followed by a decline between 
1993 and 1997. The regions as a whole experienced a decline during the same period. 
Future projections in food security 
The number of chronically undernourished people is projected to decline from the 
current 790 million (in 1995/97) to 576 million by 2015 and to 401 million by 2030 (Table 
2.6). The numbers are expected to fall in East and South Asia, and Latin America but rise in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and West Asia and North Africa by 2015. About 70 percent of the 
world's chronically undernourished people will live in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 
(Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch and Rosegrant 1997). Sub-Saharan Africa's share of the 
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world's chronically undernourished population will increase from 23 percent in 1995/97 to 
32 percent by 2015 and to 41 percent by 2030 (Table 2.6). 
Global per capita food availability is projected to increase from 2,761 kilocalories per 
day in 1995/97 to 2,960 kilcalories per day in 2015 and 3100 kilocalories per day in 2030. 
The largest increases are expected in China and East Asia and the smallest increases in West 
Asia and North Africa. In sub-Saharan Africa, average per capita food availability is 
projected to be about 2,400 kilocalories per day, slightly above the required minimum for an 
active, healthy life (Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch and Rosegrant 1997). 
Table 2.6. Projections of proportion and number of undernourished population and of per 
capita food consumption in developing countries, 2015 and 2030 
Region Year Proportion of 
undernourished 
(percent of 
populations) 
Number of 
undernourished 
(millions) 
Per capita food 
consumption 
(kcal/person/day) 
Developing countries 2015 10 576 2860 
2030 6 401 3020 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2015 22 184 2400 
2030 15 165 2580 
Near East and North Africa 2015 8 38 3090 
2030 6 35 3170 
Latin America and the Caribbean 2015 7 45 2950 
2030 5 32 3080 
South Asia 2015 10 165 2790 
2030 4 82 3040 
East Asia 2015 7 144 3020 
2030 4 86 3170 
Source: FAO 2000. 
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In terms of the global trends in food demand and supply, average yield gains may 
no longer exceed gains in average food demand as experienced during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Tweeten (1998) anticipates a much smaller gap between the growth in global food supply 
and food demand which could imply further suffering for the chronically undernourished 
populations in the developing world. The growth in cereal yields is declining and overall 
food production is projected to grow 1.28 percent in year 2000 and decline to 0.77 percent by 
2050. If population growth remains at 1.5 percent (1996 level), this could provide a real 
challenge to global food security in the future. Some studies project zero population growth 
by the end of the twenty-first century (Table 2.7). Depending on the study, food demand is 
estimated to increase between 144 and 201 percent over the 1995 level (Tweeten 1998). 
Table 2.7. Total and annual food demand growth to zero population growth from 1995 
Study Population at zero Year of zero population Food demand growth 
population growth® growth* from 1995b 
(billion) (percent) 
International Institute of 
Applied Systems Analysis 10.5 2084 144 
United Nations0 10.3 2094 147 
World Bank 1L3 2128 201 
a When data from the source were incomplete, the population at zero population growth and year are projected 
using a quadratic equation fitted to available data. 
b Assumes per capita demand grows 0.3 percent per year from income. 
c Medium population projections. 
Note: 1995 world population 5.6 billion. 
Source: Tweeten 1998. 
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CHAPTER 3. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF CHRONIC FOOD INSECURITY 
This chapter provides a discussion of various factors presented in the literature as the 
underlying causes of chronic food insecurity. This discussion is then used to identify, as well 
as offer a justification for, the variables used in the empirical model presented in Chapter 5. 
There is a general consensus that certain factors, such as poverty, have contributed to food 
insecurity in the developing world (World Bank 1986; Pinstrup-Andersen 1994; 
Alexandratos 1995). However, there is debate on whether other factors, population growth 
and food aid for example, have a negative effect on food security. Counter-arguments are 
offered in these cases. 
Poverty 
Food insecurity is considered in terms of food availability and food access. Food may 
be available at a global, national or household level, but individuals may not have access to 
food because they cannot purchase it (Webb and von Braun 1994). Therefore, poverty is 
considered by many studies to be the root cause of hunger. The literature on poverty 
indicates that poverty may be the result of limited resources, lack of access to resources, low 
level of development, lack of access to assets such as land, capital, skills or income and 
inappropriate economic policies. 
Poverty is partly a function of country income per capita. Some studies have indicated 
a close relationship between average per capita income and average per capita consumption 
of calories and a positive association between the growth of average income and the growth 
of average per capita consumption irrespective of the level of average income. Income 
distribution has also been shown to play a significant role: countries with less equal income 
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distributions have more poor, therefore hungry, people (Birdsall 1994). Low and unstable 
household incomes, limited asset wealth, low human capital and labor productivity, and high 
risk of income and consumption instability are considered characteristics of at-risk food-
insecure populations (Webb and von Braun 1994). 
However, the relationship between poverty and food security is complex. Poor people 
who can produce their own food may be more food secure than people with higher levels of 
income but dependent on the market for food. How vulnerable households are to fluctuations 
in the food supply depends on a number of factors including whether they are net buyers or 
sellers of food, the stability of their income sources and how vulnerable they are to natural 
shocks (Adelman 1996). 
Population and Urbanization 
Population growth 
The United Nations estimates that approximately 80 million people will be added to the 
world annually during the next 25 years. Most of this increase is expected to occur in 
developing countries (Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch and Rosegrant 1997). Regional 
population numbers are expected to increase by 160 percent for sub-Saharan Africa between 
1990 and 2025 compared to 107 percent in West Asia and North Africa, 56 percent in Asia, 
59 percent in Latin America, and 60 percent in the world (Bongaarts 1995). 
Sub-Saharan Africa poses a particular problem. Average population growth rates at 3 
percent per year have outstripped the average growth rate in food production at 2 percent per 
year in the region (Mitchell, Ingco and Duncan 1997), and population growth is projected to 
continue to outstrip growth in food production. Projected population growth rates for the 
region are extremely high (2.8 percent) compared to world population growth rates of 1.5 
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percent per year between 1992 and 2005. In absolute terms, the population in sub-Saharan 
Africa is estimated to increase from 527 million in 1990 to over 700 million by 2005 (USDA 
1995). It is projected that the number of people in sub-Saharan Africa will reach 1.3 billion 
by 2025 (Bongaarts 1995). 
It has been argued that rising populations drive up the demand for food. Large 
population increases in developing countries may hinder efforts to improve per capita 
income, reduce poverty and increase the standard of living of the population (Pinstrup-
Andersen 1994). High population growth rates put pressure on land resources. The growing 
demand on limited resources results in inappropriate cultivation practices, overgrazing and 
deforestation, and puts a strain on water supplies thus resulting in environmental degradation 
(Berck and Bigman 1993). The effect on the per capita food consumption and nutritional 
status of the population has adverse implications on labor and, hence, agricultural 
productivity and ultimately household incomes (USDA 1995). Consequently, rapid 
population growth is believed to reduce the impacts of gains from economic development on 
food security. 
According to the World Bank (1989), high population growth results in food security 
problems and also has adverse effects in terms of education, urbanization and the 
environment. Increased poverty is considered to be one of the main factors associated with 
rapid population growth. In fact, it has been argued that population growth may be the cause 
of the poverty facing many developing countries and that a reduction in population growth 
rates may reduce poverty and, in turn, the prevailing food problems (Dasgupta 1995). 
Developing countries' ability to provide social services including education and health are 
greatly reduced. Furthermore, high population growth affects the international system by 
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increasing the economic disparities between the developed and developing countries and 
shifting the relative demographic size among nations. There are effects on dependency 
burden, nutrition and housing needs. It is considered to affect not only the quantity but also 
the quality of human capital investments. Institutional changes such as changes in the 
organization of the family, local community and forms of government administration may 
also result. 
However, there are scholars who maintain that high population growth rates are not a 
problem since they stimulate technological advancement and promote economic 
development and higher living standards in the long run. Simon (1992) argues that positive 
population growth produces better economic performance in the long run (120 to 180 years) 
than does stationary population. In its World Development Report, the World Bank (1984) 
states that the interrelationship between development and population growth are not all fully 
understood. National differences in the economic, cultural, institutional and demographic 
setups influence the implications of rapid population growth in developing countries. 
Simmons (1988) also emphasized the importance of socio-cultural and institutional factors 
when studying the effect of population growth on economic development. Despite these 
arguments, the consensus remains that, at least for now, population growth poses a problem 
especially in the developing world and in terms of poverty, environmental degradation and 
food insecurity. 
Urbanization 
Approximately 22 percent of the population in developing countries lived in urban areas 
in 1960. This increased to 31 percent in 1980 and is expected to rise to 44 percent by 2000 
(Pinstrup-Andersen 1994). It is estimated that by 2025 the population of urban areas in 
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developing countries will increase from 1 billion to 4 billion (USDA 1996). Although, the 
focus of food insecurity has mainly been in terms of rural communities and problems, as 
urbanization increases more attention will be given to its implications on food insecurity 
(Phillips and Taylor 1991). Jaeger (1992), investigating the causes of food shortages in 
developing countries, found that among urbanization, government policies, declining world 
food prices and higher incomes, urbanization represented the strongest explanatory variable 
in determining increases in food imports for African countries4. 
Increased urban populations place severe pressures on the food marketing and 
distribution systems and the physical infrastructure, including transportation, storage, 
processing, grading and market information (McCalla 1994). Urbanization and rising 
incomes increase the demand for food and change the pattern and composition of the demand 
for food. There is a shift in consumption patterns away from traditional staple food 
commodities and toward cereals which are usually imported. This is the combined result of 
national food pricing policies and overvalued exchange rates which make imported food 
commodities cheaper, and the high costs of marketing and distribution of domestic food 
commodities. 
Urban migration implies a shift of labor resources out of agriculture and into the urban 
areas. Thus a rise in urbanization indicates lack of employment opportunities in the 
agricultural sector and may imply a reduction in agricultural production. As a result of the 
rural-to-urban migration, the rural labor supply in the food-producing areas declines while 
demand for imported food increases. The impact of urban migration on agricultural 
4 Jaeger (1992) used increases in food imports as evidence of Africa's chronic food problem. 
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production will depend on the elasticity of substitution between labor and non-labor inputs 
and the extent of the utilization of rural labor (Jaeger 1992). 
Agriculture 
Agricultural development 
To achieve food security it is important for developing countries to implement policies 
that enhance economic growth, in general, and agricultural growth and productivity, in 
particular. Most developing economies depend on agriculture as the major source of income 
and employment. The agricultural sector is not only a supplier of food but also provides 
between 40 and 80 percent of employment and earns foreign exchange through the 
production of export commodities (Mellor 1992). Studies have shown that higher 
agricultural growth is positively correlated with higher economic growth. Furthermore, 
higher food (cereal) production has stronger positive effect on per capita calorie intake than 
does growth in the manufacturing sector (Cheng 1989). 
However, during the 1950s and 1960s, the general development policies of most 
developing countries neglected agriculture. Resources were directed away from the 
agricultural sector to finance industrialization, the benefits of which were expected to trickle 
down to the poor. Industrialization was considered by many developing countries as a 
catalyst for growth and this process came at the expense of agriculture. 
The movement toward the production of cash crops instead of food commodities is 
believed to have increased food security problems. Rural-to-urban migration increased, thus 
reducing urban wages, increasing unemployment and decreasing the rate of growth in grains. 
During the 1970s, two factors affected the food security situation in the developing world 
and led to an increase in poverty rates. First, the grain crisis led to a reduction in the food aid 
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required to meet the needs of the growing urban population in developing countries. Second, 
the oil crisis led to foreign exchange constraints that made it difficult for countries to import 
grains from the world market (Adelman 1996). 
Agricultural growth is expected to not only increase production but also generate 
income through a rise in rural employment, as well as stimulate employment and income in 
non-agricultural sectors (Webb and von Braun 1994). Household assets also increase and 
this reduces their vulnerability to short-term income instability (von Braun et al. 1992). Hwa 
(1988) found that agricultural growth contributed to the overall growth of the economy 
through a rise in total factor productivity. Agricultural growth and increased agricultural 
productivity is expected to lead to growth in income and employment and better access to 
food, especially in the case of subsistence and small farmers. It is also expected to accelerate 
poverty alleviation and provide more equitable distribution. 
According to the World Bank, developing countries that concentrated on broad-based 
agricultural strategies, especially in Asia, have been able to achieve improved levels of food 
security (Serageldin and Landell-Mills 1994). Although currently facing economic 
problems, Indonesia is cited as an example of a country, which gave high priority to 
increasing agricultural and food output. As a result, agriculture contributed to economic 
growth and the growth in food output exceeded the population growth rate. Consequently, 
Indonesia was able to achieve the highest daily per capita calorie supply (2,675 calories) 
compared to low-income countries. Indonesia also dramatically reduced its import of rice 
through rice self-sufficiency policies and increased rice consumption by keeping real prices 
of rice constant from 1974 to 1986. These policies reduced the number of poor and hungry 
in the country (Serageldin and Landell-Mills 1994). Kenya is considered to be another 
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example where emphasis on the growth of its agricultural sector during the 1980s lead to 
better food security for its people. 
A study by Adelman and Berck (1991) examined development strategies for increasing 
food security in Korea in 1968 using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model5. They 
found that agricultural development and export-led growth were the most effective food-
security policies in reducing malnutrition with the former strategy dominating the latter. 
These strategies led to growth in GNP, higher mean incomes and higher income variances. 
Agricultural development also lead to increases in food consumption and it helped the 
manufacturing sector by freeing foreign exchange for import of machinery and intermediate 
inputs. Overall, agricultural development led to the lowest percentage of malnourished. 
However, researchers have argued that policies in many developing countries have 
penalized rather than promoted agricultural development. Artificially low food prices 
targeting urban consumers, artificially high input prices such as fertilizer, overvalued 
exchange rates that make food imports cheaper and depress prices for local farmers all act as 
disincentives to agricultural producers. Public investments directed toward urban rather than 
rural areas have also discouraged farmers and depressed the creation of jobs in rural areas 
(IPC 1996). 
Low taxation of agriculture has been associated with high agricultural growth. Taxation 
on agriculture has been lower in the East Asian economies compared to other developing 
countries and agricultural income and productivity has grown fastest in this region. 
Furthermore, East Asia's push for export-oriented production thus increasing the demand for 
5 Adelman and Berck examined a small, poor, open, negative balance-of trade, large food-deficit country. Although 
the results of simulations may vary depending on the type of economy and institutional specifications, they argue that 
their results of how individual programs affect different individual groups can be generalized. 
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labor, and public investment in infrastructure and basic social programs, education and health 
services also contributed to faster economic growth (Birdsall 1994). 
It is important to point out that the policies of developed countries are considered to 
have also contributed to the global food problem. Export subsidies implemented in the 
developed nations have led to lower world food prices and further exacerbated the 
disincentives faced by farmers in the developing countries. Set-aside policies have shorted 
world markets. A study by the World Bank during the early 1990s estimated that a 50 
percent reduction of trade protection by developed nations would increase export revenues to 
developing countries by US$50 billion (Pinstrup-Andersen 1994). 
Science policy for agriculture 
Low agricultural productivity contributes to food gaps (difference between production 
and demand) and hinders income growth and lower food production costs. Research and 
policy is needed to deal with expected increases in risks resulting from weather factors, poor 
market structures, etc. (Pinstrup-Andersen, Pandya-Lorch and Rosegrant 1997). Agricultural 
research is also needed to prevent environmental degradation and resource depletion while 
increasing production. Crop yields need to increase since growth through the expansion of 
agricultural land is becoming increasingly difficult because of the scarcity of cultivatable 
land around the world (USDA 1995). 
The World Bank (1986) argues that agricultural research and extension is needed to 
facilitate technological innovation and productivity growth. Technological progress in the 
form of modern inputs and biological and chemical innovations leads to higher productivity, 
better employment opportunities and increased income. Advancements in technology may 
lead to a reduction in the price of food and thus increase the real income of the poor. This in 
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turn helps improve the food consumption and nutrition of the poor. Technological 
improvements have resulted in reductions in production costs and increased global 
agricultural output (World Bank 1986). 
Investment in rural infrastructure is also considered to be important in increasing 
agricultural growth and productivity. Improved infrastructure provides access to export and 
intracountry markets, modern inputs and consumer goods. It increases production and 
marketing efficiency and reduces marketing costs and price distortions (Pinstrup-Andersen 
1994). One of the reasons that the Green Revolution was successful in Asia was the presence 
of good road networks for supplying inputs (USDA 1995). 
Prior to the 1960s, research was concentrated on export crops that would earn foreign 
exchange and export tax revenue for developing countries. Most of this research was 
conducted under the International Agricultural Research Centers supported by the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). In 1960, with the 
establishment of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, research 
began to focus on food crops and livestock. 
Extension, input supply and infrastructure aimed at increasing yields, introducing new 
crops and expanding cultivated areas, were also initially geared toward specific export crops 
because it was believed that it was both technically simpler and more profitable to 
concentrate on only one or a few crops. Although this is changing, many countries continue 
to promote export crops over food crops. In Cameroon, for example, 25 percent of the 
allocations for investment in agriculture went to food crop production and agro-industry 
while more than 60 percent went to export crops in its 1976-1981 Plan. In the case of input 
supply and extension services, the focus in both Egypt and Chad was directed toward cotton 
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production. In Brazil, policies that favor the large-scale production of inputs for agro-
industries and for exports have discriminated against small farmers who produce food crops. 
The use of modern inputs and mechanization has resulted in increased unemployment among 
farm labor. 
There are also issues related to the transferability of agricultural technology. Some 
argue that one of the reasons that agricultural production in most developing countries has 
not increased sufficiently to meet domestic demands is that the technology was not 
appropriate for the vast majority of small farmers (Ruttan 1987). Furthermore, many have 
emphasized the importance of extension in transferring technology to farmers in marginal 
areas. 
Historical trends 
Yields increased dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s accounting for 65 percent of 
the increase in global rice production, 80 percent of the increase in wheat production and 90 
percent of the increase in the production of coarse grains. In addition, production increases 
during the Green Revolution have been improved not only through efficient use of inputs and 
enhanced crop yields but also through investment in infrastructure, higher farmgate prices, 
greater access to credit and improvements in agricultural extension. These technological 
advancements have kept world prices low. 
Although the improvements of the Green Revolution have benefited Southeast Asia and 
parts of Latin America, they have bypassed the African continent (World Bank 1986). 
Unlike in Asia and Latin America where farmers had access to irrigation and markets, 
farmers in Africa worked on rainfed, marginal lands with fragile soils. These farmers were 
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unable to increase yields and, furthermore, had to compete with those who adopted the new 
technologies. 
The advancements in agriculture over the past three decades have played a major role in 
reducing the percentage of hungry and malnourished people around the world from 35 
percent in 1969-71 to 20 percent in 1990-92. Per capita food supplies increased from 2135 
kilocalories per day to 2750 kilocalories per day (IPC 1996). Furthermore, investments in 
agricultural research have shown high rates of return during the 1980s and early 1990s, even 
in Africa (Webb and von Braun 1994). Investments in research have resulted in rates of 
return exceeding 35 percent in some cases (Pinstrup-Andersen 1994). 
Even in Africa, countries that have invested in agricultural technology and reformed 
their policies have been able to increase economic and agricultural growth rates and food 
production. Mali has been able to achieve 8 percent agricultural growth in 1994 and 1995 
and is now an exporter of some commodities. Other countries such as Senegal, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya and Guinea have also experienced positive growth rates in 
agriculture (US AID 1997). 
Although expenditure in agricultural research doubled between 1970 and 1980 in 
developing countries, expenditure levels have stagnated since then. The annual growth rates 
in research investment declined in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1980s (ISNAR 1992). Many developing 
countries are now underinvesting in agricultural research. About 80 percent of aggregate 
agricultural research expenditure in developing countries is concentrated in 20 relatively 
large countries in Asia and Latin America (Binswanger and Landell-Mills 1995). 
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Thus, the rate of growth in global food production has slowed. Per capita food 
production declined in 35 developing countries during the period from 1980 to 1994, the 
majority in sub-Saharan Africa (USDA 1995). In order to increase agricultural production, 
developing countries need to raise the yield on arable land as less new land becomes 
available for production. This entails disease-resistant seeds and improved and balanced 
fertilizer and other crop protection chemicals and new production methods. These goals can 
only be achieved through agricultural research and development. 
Access to land 
Most of the area expansion for agricultural production is expected to occur in 
developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. This expansion, however, requires 
increased investments to improve the quality of the land with crop potential and to reduce the 
amount of land currently being lost to urbanization and environmental degradation. A major 
problem is that even the existing land currently available for agricultural production is not 
accessible to a significant number of rural households in developing countries. 
According to von Braun et al. (1992), availability of land not only provides a source for 
food supply but also a source of employment and income for the rural population. At the 
micro-level, ownership or access to land has a significant effect on household food security. 
Food insecurity tends to be more prevalent among the landless poor. During the drought of 
1982 in North Arcot, India, 73 percent of landless households were food deficient compared 
with 61 percent of households who owned land (von Braun et al. 1992). 
Many of the small farmers in the developing world subsist on less than one hectare of 
marginal land. In many regions, particularly in Latin America, there is inequality in the 
distribution of landholdings and the trend seems to be worsening. The number of landless 
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populations has increased and this implies that these populations are vulnerable to food 
insecurity. In countries where policies of land reform were implemented, such as in the 
Republic of Korea and in China and Taiwan, improved land distribution contributed to 
significant agricultural growth and improved food security (Alamgir and Arora 1991). 
Terms of trade 
Evidence shows that liberalization of agricultural policies and markets tend to lead to 
growth in the agricultural sector which in turn increases rural income (example, China during 
the late 1970s). Countries, particularly those in Africa, which do not have liberal agricultural 
policies have faced food shortages, widespread malnutrition and even famine. Liberalizing 
agricultural policies and providing incentives to agricultural producers would lead to an 
increase in domestic production of agricultural commodities for which they have a 
comparative advantage and increase rural incomes. Thus more people would have the ability 
to purchase food and countries would be able to import food at the national level. 
In many developing countries hunger and poverty are most prevalent in the rural areas. 
Government policies in the form of overvalued exchange rates, industrial protection policies, 
allocation of public expenditure and some trade policies have taxed the agricultural sectors as 
a result of urban bias. Urban bias has also directed investments in infrastructure around the 
urban centers. Poor infrastructure and transportation, particularly in the rural areas, have 
resulted in high transport costs and market uncertainties. This has increased the price of 
crops produced and the difficulty in getting them to market. 
Overvalued Exchange Rate 
Many low-income countries in the developing world have overvalued exchange rates, 
partly to keep food prices low in order to maintain low nominal wages and partly as a result 
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of high protective barriers to benefit import-substituting industries. The overvalued 
exchange rate is equivalent to an export tax and to an import subsidy. Since most developing 
countries export primarily agricultural commodities, this export tax is a bias against the 
agricultural sector. It acts as a disincentive to the production of agricultural exports and 
domestic food production competing with imported foodstuffs (Alexandratos 1988). 
Imports are also much higher than with exchange rates closer to equilibrium. This 
results from a higher domestic price and lower real prices of food imports. Overvalued 
exchange rates also lead to a misallocation and inefficient use of resources which leads to 
slow economic growth. The prices of tradable goods are lower relative to nontradable goods 
(World Bank 1986). 
Access to Credit 
Household food security can be improved through access to credit that would stabilize 
consumption and promote self-employment. However, the majority of institutional credit in 
developing countries is available mostly to the large and medium farmers producing 
agricultural commodities for the market. No more than 25 percent of smallholder credit 
needs are provided through institutional lending. Lack of collateral, illiteracy and poor 
repayment rates are cited among the main reasons why the rural poor are unable to acquire 
credit from traditional banking institutions. This inaccessibility to formal credit channels 
forces poor farmers to resort to informal sources of credit with very high costs that further 
exacerbate their food insecurity (Alamgir and Arora 1991). 
One example of the success of programs giving access to small-scale credit to the poor 
is the Grameen Bank which provides interest-bearing credit without collateral. This has 
facilitated the accumulation of capital by the poor and generated new employment. The 
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resulting increase in income leads to increase in absolute expenditure on food consumption 
(von Braun et al. 1992). Agricultural producers also need credit for modern inputs. 
Education 
Researchers argue that agricultural production needs to increase in order to raise per 
capita food consumption and improve the standard of living. Agricultural production can 
benefit from basic education (literacy and numeracy education) which can significantly 
improve the efficacy of training and agricultural extension work. This may enhance the 
productivity of inputs including labor; reduce the costs of acquiring and using information 
about production technology that can increase productive efficiency; and facilitate 
entrepreneurship and responses to changing market conditions and technological 
developments. Studies have shown that years of education are positively related to higher 
agricultural productivity (Alexandratos 1995). 
Although public expenditure on education increased in developing countries, this 
increase has not been uniform across the developing world. In sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America and the Caribbean, expenditure on education declined during the 1980s. Despite the 
overall improvement in education expenditures, there still exist a large number of illiterate 
adults, particularly in the rural areas of developing countries (Alexandratos 1995]). 
Export Earnings 
The ability of many low-income, food-deficit countries to generate income from 
agriculture, as well as export revenues to import food, depends on their relative international 
competitiveness in agriculture. Trade in agricultural commodities enhances rural incomes, 
and therefore the ability to buy food (Binswanger and Landell-Mills 1995). Many 
developing countries do not have access to world markets to sell their export commodities. 
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Trade barriers are erected by developed countries preventing developing countries from 
selling their export goods and therefore the ability to finance food imports. Furthermore, 
many developing countries, particularly African countries, face plummeting world prices for 
key agricultural commodities thus reducing export earnings. In contrast, prices of essential 
commodities such as oil have increased. 
The ability to import food allows countries to meet the needs of their population thus 
lowering the cost of food to consumers and freeing resources to more efficient uses. Net 
grain imports in developing countries are projected to increase from 87 million tons in 1990 
to 210 million tons by 2010 (Mitchell, Ingco and Duncan 1997). Without export earnings, 
developing countries are not able to generate the necessary foreign exchange to import food. 
The allocation of scarce foreign exchange to food imports during food shortages results in 
déstabilisation of import of investment goods. This has an adverse effect on the economy 
(von Braun et al. 1992). Constraints in foreign exchange affects food insecurity as it 
influences the amount of food imports a country can purchase in the world market at the 
expense of non-food imports and their effect on economic development (Green and 
Kirkpatrick 1982; Kirkpatrick and Diakosawas 1985). 
Food Aid 
It has been debated that food aid may have some negative impact on developing 
recipient countries such as distortion of domestic markets thus exacerbating food problems. 
During the 1960s, food aid made up a large part of import needs in developing countries, 
which gave low priority to agriculture as a result. Food aid also acted as a disincentive to 
farmers as it affected local food prices and resulted in a shift in consumption patterns from 
traditional crops to imported crops (for example, wheat in sub-Saharan Africa). 
40 
Food aid has also been used to support inadequate agricultural policies by recipient 
countries such as food price subsidies which have been argued to inhibit the growth of 
domestic food production in the short ran and misallocation of resources in the long run. 
This makes developing countries dependent on food aid. According to the World Bank, food 
aid does not help countries cope with food insecurity resulting from rising international food 
prices. When food prices are higher in the international market, less food can be purchased 
on fixed budgets for food aid. Budgets for food aid are also often reduced when prospects 
for commercial exports improve. Food aid also does not tend to reach the poorest and the 
neediest segments of the developing nations. 
Adelman and Berck (1991) found that food aid is not effective as a strategy for 
eliminating food insecurity. In fact, they concluded that without appropriate measures to 
reduce its adverse effects, food aid is "an overall food-security disaster, though it does help a 
few urban groups" (Adelman and Berck 1991, 49). 
However, some empirical studies have not been able to support these claims. Examples 
of countries that were major food aid recipients but no longer are include India, South Korea 
and Taiwan. These findings argue that the disincentive effects of food aid on agriculture are 
not so pronounced. The effects of food aid depend on food and agricultural policies 
implemented by recipient countries. Policies must be put in place to reduce or eliminate the 
potential disincentive effects of food aid (von Braun 1992). Furthermore, food aid can be 
used to increase human capital formations by improving nutrition and as an incentive to 
participate in formal schooling and training programs without having significant disincentive 
effects on agricultural production. 
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External Debt 
During the 1970s, many countries in the developing world borrowed money from 
foreign creditors. Most of these loans were not spent on income-generating activities. About 
15 to 20 percent went into military expenditures while the rest was lost to unproductive 
projects, corruption and importing consumer goods. By the early 1980s, many governments 
were unable to service their debts and turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
credit. In order to obtain IMF funding, developing countries had to implement structural 
adjustment policies that adversely affected the poor. Reductions in public expenditure, 
consumption and subsidies, the higher domestic prices resulting from devaluation of 
domestic currencies and the movement away from staple food production and toward export 
production all contributed to the decline in the welfare of the poor. Wages declined, 
unemployment increases, and malnutrition and infant mortality rose (Collins 1991). 
Countries need export surplus to service their debts. This reduces their capacity to 
import food particularly if export earnings are insufficient or decline and demand for food 
imports increases. Thus, developing countries with high external debts become increasingly 
vulnerable to food insecurity when faced with production or export shortfalls, or rising 
import prices (Alamgir and Arora 1991). 
Political Participation 
The relationship between food security and the political structure in developing 
countries has not been studied extensively. One hypothesis that may be investigated as a 
source of food problems in developing countries is the effect of political institutions on 
economic growth and agricultural development. Political institutions, in the form of 
42 
political, civil and economic rights, have been ignored when explaining economic 
development until recently. 
Political systems and institutional setups are generally assumed as given in studies 
determining economic growth. However, according to Sen (1994a), political rights are 
crucial both in "inducing political responses to economic needs" and in "the 
conceptualization of economic needs" (36). The following chapter examines the issue of 
political institutions and their link to economic growth in general and attempts to provide a 
link to food problems in particular. 
43 
CHAPTER 4. THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
Political Institutions and Economic Growth 
Theoretical perspective 
Adelman and Hihn (1984) provide a review of theories of change in political structures 
and economic development. Classical modernization theory argues that economic 
development leads to equality, stability and democracy6 while contemporary modernization 
theory argues that the high correlation between economic development, equity and political 
participation is seen only in highly developed economies. Classical Marxist theory considers 
class conflict as the catalyst for economic and political change. Contemporary Marxists 
concentrate on the interactions of external and internal effects on political and economic 
change. Some contemporary political scientists believe that "historical sequencing of 
political competition and political inclusiveness" determine political systems and that these 
systems are affected by factors such as the current socioeconomic structure, the level of 
development, the degree of inequality and international influences (Adelman and Hihn 1984, 
2). 
A bureaucratic-authoritarian model argues that slow economic growth may lead to 
political change through coalition between the educated technical elite and the military, as is 
the case in Latin America. A change-agent theory proposes that groups ranked according to 
economic, political and social status may experience rank disequilibrium if they do not have 
6 According to Bollen (1980), there has been some debate on the theoretical definition of political democracy. He 
reviews some of the definitions of democracy and offers a definition of political democracy as "the extent to which 
the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the nonelite is maximized (Bollen 1980, 372). 
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the same rank on all three scales. To achieve rank equilibrium the group or groups bring 
about economic and political change (Adelman and Hihn, 1984). 
Olson (1993) provides an interesting theory based on the assumption of rational self-
interest to explain both democracy and autocracy. In order for a society to function 
satisfactorily, it requires peaceful order and other public goods. For this reason autocracy is 
preferred to anarchy. A rational self-interested autocrat provides security from theft and 
other public goods to the society as an incentive for the society to produce. The autocrat then 
extracts production surpluses by imposing a revenue-maximizing tax rate on his society. The 
time horizon of the autocrat is an important consideration as autocrats with short planning 
horizons tend to confiscate wealth, expropriate assets and revoke contracts, a disincentive for 
production which reduces income and tax collections. 
When comparing democracy and autocracy, Olson assumed that leaders in a democratic 
society are also motivated by self-interest and avoids a better motivation as an objective of 
democracy so that democracy is not given an unfair advantage over autocracy. Democratic 
leaders try to "buy" majority votes by transferring income from the general population to the 
prospective majority. However, in this case the optimal tax rate is lower than the revenue-
maximizing tax rate of the autocrat as income will be maximized with a lower tax rate and a 
smaller redistribution of output. Thus, a democratic system prevents its leaders from 
significant extraction of social surplus. In terms of individual rights to property and 
contracts, Olson states that "the conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same 
necessary for the security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth" 
(1993, 567). According to Olson, good economic performance in autocratic systems does not 
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last for more than two generations while stable democracies have been able to maintain good 
economic performance across generations. 
Broadly speaking there are two schools of thought in terms of the relationship between 
democracy and economic growth. Some argue that democracy hinders economic growth 
while others argue that democracy enhances economic growth. Opponents of democracy 
argue that developing countries cannot achieve economic growth through a democratic 
framework since democracy and economic growth are competing goals. Rapid economic 
growth requires an authoritarian government to deal with the "problems of nation-building, 
to contain discontent, and to control domestic pressures" (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990, 130). To 
facilitate economic growth, authoritarian rule can curb consumption and increase savings and 
investment. The authoritarian state can also insulate itself from private pressures. 
Advocates of democracy argue that authoritarian regimes are inefficient and do not 
maximize output (Przeworski and Limongi 1993). Democracies stimulate sustained and 
equitable growth, broaden markets and motivate citizens to save and invest (Sirowy and 
Inkeles 1990). Authoritarian governments may also have the tendency to steal the nation's 
wealth and make nonproductive investments (Barro 1997). 
Studies on political institutions and economic growth 
A number of studies look at the relationship between democracy and economic 
growth/development (Weede 1983; Scully 1988; McMillan, Rausser and Johnson 1993; 
Barro 1997). Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), and Przeworski and Limongi (1993) provide a 
summary of other studies on democracy and economic growth and a review of the arguments 
for and against democracy and its effect on economic growth. 
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Weede (1983) concluded that when both developed and less-developed countries are 
studied together political democracy has a negative but weak effect on economic growth. He 
argues that while this may not be the case for all countries, in countries where the economy is 
controlled by the state, political democracy hinders economic growth. Scully (1988) 
compared the institutional framework, measured in terms of political, civil and economic 
liberties to compound growth rates of real domestic product per capita for 115 countries and 
found that the choice of the institutional framework had significant and large effects on 
economic efficiency and growth. "Politically-open" countries grew at three times the rate 
and were two and one-half times as efficient as "politically-closed" countries. 
McMillan, Rausser and Johnson (1994) found that higher and sustained economic 
growth can be achieved through institutional, constitutional and policy changes. These, in 
turn, lead to improved political and civil rights. Barro (1997) found a nonlinear relationship 
between democracy and economic growth where democracy increases growth in countries 
with weak political freedoms, but hinders growth in countries with moderate freedoms. Both 
Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), and Przeworski and Limongi (1993) reviewed studies that arrive 
at one of three conclusions: a negative relationship between economic growth and 
democracy; no relationship between the two; and a qualified or conditional relationship. 
Some studies attempted to examine variables other than economic growth and/or 
democracy. Deaton (1993) looked at the relationship between world prices of primary 
commodity exports and the survival of leaders in Africa. On the premise that world prices 
are not affected by domestic political events in most African countries and that they affect 
GDP, the study found that economic growth helps leaders remain in power so that the 
direction of causality was from economic growth to political survival. 
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Fosu (1992) looked at the effect of institutional stability on economic growth in sub-
Saharan African countries and concluded that political instability has a negative effect on 
economic growth. It decreased the marginal productivity of capital and exports. Results also 
gave some indication of negative effects on capital, labor and export quantities. For 
countries with high political instability, annual GDP growth was reduced by an average of 33 
percent of the mean annual GDP growth rate of 3.37 percent for a sample of 31 sub-Saharan 
African countries for the period between 1960 and 1986. Fosu concluded that political 
instability in developing countries might have contributed greatly to their stagnating 
economies and the low or declining growth rates of their GDP. 
Thus, many of the studies show an association between economic growth and 
democracy or political and civil rights. The difficult question lies in the direction of 
causality. Does higher economic growth result in more rights or vice versa? According to 
Deaton (1993), results from earlier studies have proven to be inconclusive in determining the 
direction of causality. Barro summarized the result of the various studies as "the net effect of 
democracy on growth is theoretically inconclusive" (Barro 1997, 33). Przeworski and 
Limongi (1993) arrive at the same conclusion. 
Political Institutions and Food Insecurity 
Food insecurity has important political dimensions. Poverty is the root cause of food 
insecurity and the participation of the poor in the political process is weak. According to 
Maxwell (1997), achieving food security is a political matter in addition to being a technical 
matter. To eliminate poverty and therefore food insecurity, governments need to provide the 
poor with access to economic and social opportunities. These opportunities are "ultimately 
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issues of the functioning of political systems" (Walters and Bissell 1994, p. 131). Political 
accountability and political freedom give the public some influence on reform decisions. 
Public action, in the form of governmental initiatives and public participation, is a 
critical factor in eliminating persistent hunger and famines. "The demand for action through 
political activism, journalistic pressures, and informed criticism can help to identify both 
persistent hunger and famine risk" (Webb and von Braun 1994, p. 207). Countries with more 
pluralistic politics and open channels of communication and criticism have been more 
successful in preventing famine than countries where political opposition and free speech 
were limited or non-existent. However, democracy is vulnerable in countries with high 
external debt, disease, hunger and poverty (Webb and von Braun 1994). 
According to Sen (1994b), hunger exists because of failure of entitlement by the poor, 
i.e., their inability to establish command over adequate food and other essentials. Thus 
famines exist during adequate to high food availability. Governments in many developing 
countries often do not act quickly to prevent famines because they do not have to face 
reelection. Democracy and free press are critical in bringing forth the effects of starvation, 
disease and death during famines and pressuring the government into action. 
Sen (1994b) argues that this is the reason a famine has never occurred in a democratic 
(developed or developing) country with a free press. For example, democratic countries such 
as Botswana and Zimbabwe were able to avoid famines during the early 1980s, while non-
democratic Sudan and Ethiopia did not, even though Botswana and Zimbabwe faced much 
higher food shortages. The democratic systems in Botswana and Zimbabwe made it 
imperative that their governments implement timely and extensive famine prevention policies 
in order to avoid harsh criticism from opposition parties (Sen 1994a). 
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With democracy and free press, people are able to become politically active in 
influencing public policy. However, the issue is more complex in terms of reduction or 
elimination of endemic hunger. For example, China made dramatic improvements in the 
elimination of endemic undernutrition but was unable to avoid famine in the late 1950s. 
Democratic India, on the other hand, has avoided famine although endemic undernutrition 
still exists. One explanation is that endemic undernutrition is not as visible as the effects of 
famine on populations and therefore governments are not as pressured by free press and the 
politically active to act (Webb and von Braun 1994). 
In terms of the reduction of poverty, countries where the elite have political as well as 
economic power tend to implement policies that are likely to favor the elite (Birdsall 1994). 
A democratic distribution of economic power via access by the poor to food-producing and 
income-generating resources is crucial in terms of eliminating hunger. Thus a strategy of 
increasing food production through technology without taking into consideration who owns 
the productive resources may adversely affect the poor. In India, for example, the Green 
Revolution increased the productive capacity of the land, thus, benefiting the well-to-do 
farmers who controlled the land. This increased the value of the land by three to five-fold 
within a few years. As a result, rents increased and the tenant farmers were pushed off the 
land, doubling the number of landless in the twenty years following the introduction of 
"Green Revolution" technology. Although food production increased, the number of 
undernourished also rose (Collins 1991). 
Population growth rates may also be influenced by the political structure. According to 
Collins (1991), "rapid population growth is rooted in economic insecurity generated and 
perpetuated by antidemocratic power structures. Indeed, rapid population growth can 
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perhaps best be understood to result largely from efforts by the poor to cope in the face of the 
concentrated economic power of the elite" (p. 357). The rural poor have a large number of 
children to enhance their incomes through work in agricultural and other economic activities. 
For this reason, poverty and high population growth often occur together. Given political 
rights and civil liberties, people are able to acquire control over economic resources and 
therefore, to access food through either production and/or purchase. 
Another dimension in the question of democracy and political rights is the issue of 
urban bias. Political pressure by the urban consumer to keep food prices low because of low 
wages, and the high cost of collective action by farmers in developing countries have resulted 
in the taxation of agriculture. According to Bates (1981), agricultural policy consequently 
becomes a byproduct of political relations between governments and urban populations. 
Governments also use the market as a basis for political control. In many African countries, 
the purchase and export of agricultural commodities is controlled by public monopsonies and 
marketing agencies. Farmers are paid lower prices for their agricultural products and 
domestic prices are kept low. 
The agricultural sector is also taxed because its exportables are a major source of 
income in many developing countries given the lack of alternative tax instruments. As 
countries become more developed and wages increase, the governments face less political 
pressure to keep food prices low and a smaller farming population becomes more organized 
and able to exert political pressure (Beghin and Kherallah 1994). A study by Beghin and 
Kherallah (1994) shows that political systems influence agricultural protection levels 
nonlinearly. Agricultural assistance is most prominent in dominant party systems, becomes 
non-increasing as systems become more democratic and then rents tend to dissipate under the 
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most democratic systems. Foreign assistance, particularly in the form of food aid, also 
depends to some extent on the political structure of the recipient country. In 1981, the World 
Bank acknowledged that it was difficult to provide aid to some countries because of their 
political situations. 
Judd, Boyce and Evenson (1986) found that several factors affect the allocation of 
resources to research and extension including institutional barriers such as high prices of 
national scientific resources and political factors. It has been shown that countries which 
have a large proportion of their population in the agricultural labor force invest less in 
research and extension. Also, most of the agricultural research is concentrated on traded 
commodities rather than nontraded commodities. This underinvestment is related to political 
influence and a lack of awareness of potential benefits. Much of the agricultural population 
in developing countries is comprised of small farmers, food producers and agricultural 
laborers. Most of the political power lies with the urban population and thus the rural sector 
has little influence especially in terms of expenditure in research and extension programs. 
This has resulted in a bias against investment in agricultural research and technology which, 
in turn, has a significant negative impact on productivity in the agricultural sector and 
ultimately on food security. 
Dasgupta and Weale (1992) ranked low-income countries according to national income 
per capita, life expectancy at birth, infant survival rate, adult literacy rate and, political and 
civil liberties using the Borda Rule as an aggregator. They compared improvements in 
socioeconomic performance with the presence of the political and civil liberties. They found 
that there was a positive and significant correlation between political and civil liberties and 
national income per capita, improvements in infant survival rates and increases in life 
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expectancy at birth. However, a surprising outcome was that increases in the adult literacy 
rate are negatively and significantly correlated with political and civil liberties. 
In terms of food, the extent of the power relationships exercised by the government, 
agro-industry and market forces influence production decisions which, in turn, influence the 
entire food chain. Thus, government policy decisions concerning food are not only affected 
by production, consumption and trade considerations but also the political power of the 
producers, consumers and other groups (van de Walle 1992). 
53 
CHAPTER 5. DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
This study provides an empirical analysis of the causes of chronic food insecurity. 
A cross-sectional econometric model is used. The purpose of the study is to establish 
stylized facts about the influence of political institutions on the indicator of food security as 
measured by per capita dietary energy supply. The empirical analysis attempts to assess the 
relative importance of the independent variables in explaining the differences among 
countries for a given indicator of food insecurity. Thus, the indicator of food insecurity is 
regressed on selected economic and social variables. 
According to the FAO, the majority of food-insecure (undernourished) people live in 
South and Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, followed by East Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean and the Middle East and North Africa (FAO 1996)7. In order to make 
comparisons among countries with varying degrees of food security and food insecurity, the 
study covers both developed and developing countries. The data are for the period 1975, 
1985 and 1995. The following section discusses some of the mo»del variables and why they 
were selected. 
Discussion of Some of the Model Variables 
Dependent variable 
The number of food-insecure people in the world has been estimated using different 
methods. One of the most common measures of food insecurity8 is the "number of people 
7 The method by which the FAO measures chronic undernourishment, an indicator of food insecurity, has been 
criticized as methodologically biased toward national food availability and does not adequately account for the 
problem of access to food (Smith 1997). 
Here, Bigman (1993) is referring to food insecurity under a stable food supply. The measure of food insecurity 
under instability is given as the probability that food consumption of the poor falls below a specific critical level, i.e., 
minimum subsistence level or a fraction of that level. 
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whose food consumption falls below a predetermined minimum level which is deemed 
necessary for good health" (Bigman 1993, 238). However, this measure of food insecurity 
does not take into account the interpersonal variations in food consumption due to 
inequalities in income distribution nor does it indicate the depth of the gap between actual 
and minimum consumption levels. Furthermore, this measure ignores the effects of 
temporary food shortages in food availability that affects both the numbers and the extent of 
undernourishment (Bigman 1993). 
Countries with widespread food security problems are determined by looking at several 
indicators including low average levels of calorie consumption (below 2100 ldlocalories per 
capita), levels of and large fluctuations in food consumption, and large numbers of absolute 
poor (von Braun et al. 1992). A study by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (TFAO) determined the number of undernourished at a certain basal metabolic 
rate (BMR) level. The World Bank looked at the number of people who did not have enough 
income to obtain a minimum calorie diet that would prevent serious health risks and stunted 
growth (estimated at 340 million in 1980) and the number of people who did not have 
enough income for food to live an active working life (estimated at 730 million in 1980) 
(World Bank 1986). 
A study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (DFPRI) examined calorie-
consumption information to determine the number of calorie-deficient people in developing 
countries. Per capita food consumption is also used as an indicator, albeit poor, of the 
number of people with inadequate diets. However, these estimates give an approximate 
indication of the incidence of food-energy deficiency among the poor and not of food 
insecurity. They do not take into account fluctuations and risks in the availability of and 
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access to food (von Braun et al. 1992). Furthermore, the measurements are made with the 
optimistic assumption that income distribution has remained the same during the period 
under study. 
Political variables 
Political rights and civil liberties compiled by the Freedom House will be used as 
measures of democracy9. Political rights are defined as the rights which "enable people to 
participate freely in the political process" and the index looks at free elections of officials, the 
right to organize and reasonable self-determination among other things. Civil liberties are 
"the freedoms to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state" and 
the index includes freedom of the media and open discussion, freedom of assembly and 
political organization and freedom from persecution (Ryan 1995, 672)10. The political 
process is the system by which people can elect authoritative policy makers and can make 
decisions on public policies through their elected representatives. Bollen (1980) argues 
against the indiscriminant use of indicators for political instability, voter participation, 
socialist party strength or labor union strength in the construction of political democracy. He 
contends that, although these concepts are important in their own right, their inclusion in the 
political democracy index has led to conflicting results in a number of empirical studies. 
Political rights and civil liberties are each rated on a seven-category scale with 1 
representing the most free and 7 representing the least free. Countries are also placed in 
three broad categories based on the average category numbers for both political rights and 
civil liberties. An average between 1 and 2.5 is considered "free", between 3 and 5.5 "partly 
9 Bollen (1990) discusses the problems surrounding the definition and measurement of political democracy. 
10 Gastil (1990) and Ryan (1995) offer a comprehensive discussion on the checklists used to rate countries according 
to political rights and civil liberties. 
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free" and between 5.5 and 7 "not free" (see Appendix A for the checklist used by Freedom 
House to rate political rights and civil liberties). 
The use of ordinal rankings as continuous variables presents econometric difficulties 
and one solution is to transform the continuous variable into a set of dummy variables 
corresponding to high, medium and low levels of freedom (Scully 1988). Scully (1988) 
found that the inclusion of all the political variables (political rights, civil and economic 
liberties) into the model presented some multicollinearity and that separability of rights is 
relatively weak. Instead of using political rights and civil liberties indices separately as 
measures of democracy, an appropriate option would be to use the sum of the indices such 
that they jointly range from 2 to 14 (Murdoch, Sandler and Sargent 1997). We can then 
define three dummy variables to represent the countries that are free, partly free and not free 
(Murdoch and Sandler 1997; Murdoch, Sandler and Sargent 1997). 
Economic variables 
Food security is affected by government intervention and the extent to which 
governments impose constraints on the production, distribution and consumption of goods 
and services. One measure that incorporates a number of economic factors that reflect 
government intervention is the index of economic freedom. Individuals enjoy economic 
freedom if they are not constrained by their governments in terms of production, distribution, 
or consumption of goods and services (Johnson, Holmes and Kirkpatrick 1998). The 
economic factors taken into account when measuring the index of economic freedom include 
trade policy; taxation; government intervention in the economy; monetary policy; capital 
flows and foreign investment; banking; wage and price controls; property rights; regulation; 
and black market (see Appendix B for a detailed explanation of these factors). 
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The index of economic freedom ranks countries according to their level of economic 
freedom. The ten factors taken into account are treated as equally important, i.e., they are 
assigned an equal weight. Johnson, Holmes and Kirkpatrick (1998) argue that there is not 
sufficient scientific support to treating some economic factors as more important than others 
and that, for long-term economic growth, a country must perform well in all the ten factors 
included in the index. 
An overall economic freedom score is given to each country of thel87 countries studied 
by averaging the ten individual factor scores with each factor being scored according to its 
own unique grading scale. The scores range from 1 to 5. A country is economically free if it 
achieves an average overall score of 1.99 or less; mostly free if the score is between 2.00 and 
2.99; mostly not free if the country has a score between 3.00 and 3.99; and repressed for a 
country with an average overall score of 4.00 or higher. 
The study also looked at economic freedom indices as measured by the Freedom House 
for 82 countries. In this case, the index measures the extent to which governments prevent 
their citizens from exercising their right to own property, earn a living, operate a business, 
invest their earnings, trade internationally, and participate equally in all aspects of the market 
economy (see Appendix C for a detailed description). A country must also have a legal and 
institutional framework within which market transactions can occur. 
The scoring scale for the freedom to trade internationally and the freedom to participate 
equally in all aspects of the economy range from 0 to 2, where 2 is the greatest degree of 
freedom and 0 is little or no freedom. The rest of the indicators have a scoring scale ranging 
from 0 to 3 with 3 being the most free and 0 being not free. Thus, countries with a score of 
13 or more are rated as "free", a score between 10 and 12 rates a country as "partly free", 
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countries rated between 7 and 9 are "mostly not free", countries with a score of 6 or less are 
considered "not free" (Messick 1996). 
Although the Freedom House index used different indicators than the Heritage 
Foundation index, the ratings of these foundations are very similar. However, there are two 
exceptions to this. Singapore was rated as free by the Heritage Foundation but partly free by 
Freedom House that concluded that while Singapore encourages foreign investments, its 
citizens do not enjoy full economic freedom. South Africa was given a mostly not free rating 
by the Heritage Foundation but a free rating by Freedom House as the latter's indicators 
pointed to opportunities for individual economic advancement. Since data is available for 
more countries, this study uses the index of economic freedoms as measured by the Heritage 
Foundation. 
Description of the Data 
Based on the discussions presented in the preceding chapters, the description of the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables included in the analysis are presented in 
this section. Most of the data used in this study was obtained from The World Bank's 1998 
World Development Indicators database (World Bank 1998) which is comprised of annual 
time-series data for developed and developing countries from 1960 to 1996. Daily dietary 
energy supply per capita, the dependent variable used an indicator of food insecurity, was 
obtained from F AO's The Sixth World Food Survey (FAO 1996) and from the FAOSTAT 
Statistical Database (http//apps.fao.org) on the World Wide Web. Table 5.2 lists the 
variables used in the analysis and their definitions. Appendix D provides the descriptive 
statistics of the regression variables and information on the data used. 
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Table 5.2. Definition and source of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Arable land (hectares per person) 
(LAND) 
Cereal production (metric tons) 
(CEREAL) 
Economic freedom (HECF) 
Export growth (%) (XGRT) 
External debt (EDEBT) 
Female enrollment (FEMP) 
Fertility rate, total (births per 
woman) (FRATE) 
Fertilizer consumption (100 grams 
per hectare of arable land) 
(FERTC) 
GDP growth (%) (GDPGRT) 
Gini Coefficient (GINI) 
Government consumption (% of 
GDP) (GCON) 
Gross domestic investment (% of 
GDP) (GINV) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita, PPP 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of 
people 15+) (LID 
Inflation (average rate) (AVGINF) 
Irrigated land (% of arable land) 
dRRIG) 
Land under temporary crops, temporary meadows for 
mowing or pasture, and land under market and kitchen 
gardens. 
Cereals include wheat, rice, maize, barley, oats, rye, 
millet, sorghum, buckwheat, and mixed grains. 
Production data on cereals relate to crops harvested for 
dry grain only. They exclude cereal crops harvested for 
hay or harvested green for food, feed, or silage and those 
used for grazing. 
See section on "Discussion of some of the model 
variables" in Chapter 5 
Average growth of export of goods and services (1991-
1995). Exports of goods and services represent the value 
of all goods and other market services provided to the 
world. Included is the value of merchandise and non-
factor services. 
Total external debt per capita in current US dollars 
Female enrollment ratios in primary school as a 
percentage of men 
Represents the number of children that would be born to 
a woman if she were to live to the end of her 
childbearing years and bear children in accordance with 
prevailing age-specific fertility rates. 
The quantity of plant nutrients used per unit of arable 
land. Fertilizer products cover nitrogenous, potash, and 
phosphate fertilizers (including ground rock phosphate). 
The time reference for fertilizer consumption is the crop 
year. 
Average growth rate of real GDP per capita (constant 
1987 US dollars) 1991-1995 
Measures inequality in the distribution of income 
General government consumption (1991-1995) 
Average gross domestic investment as a percentage of 
GDP (1991-1995) 
Gross National Product (GNP), purchasing power parity, 
current international prices 
The proportion of adults aged 15 and older who are 
literate 
Average growth rate of GDP deflator (1987=100) (1991-
1995) 
The area purposely provided with water, including land 
irrigated by controlled flooding. 
World Bank" 
World Bank" 
Heritage 
Foundation6 
World Bank* 
World Bank8 
World 
Resource 
Institute6 
World Bank" 
World Bank" 
World Bank" 
Deininger 
and Squired 
World Bank" 
World Bank* 
World Bank* 
World Bank* 
World Bank" 
World Bank* 
Source: * 1998 World Development Indicators CD-ROM, The World Bank (World Bank 1998); b 1999 Index of 
Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation (Johnson, Bryan T., Kim R. Holmes and Melanie Kirkpatrick 
1998);c World Resources Database 1996-97;d Deininger and Squire 1996;e UNESCO Statistics Database 
1999; f The Sixth World Food Survey, FAO (FAO 1996);8 World Survey of Economic Freedom, The Freedom 
House (Messick 1998); h United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Services, 1998. 
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Table 5.2. (continued) 
Variable Definition Source 
Labor force growth (%) (LABFRC) 
Labor force in agriculture (%) 
(AGLAB) 
Military expenditure (% of GNP) 
(MILEXP) 
Official development assistance and 
official aid (US$) (ODA) 
Per capita cereal consumption 
(CEREAL) 
Per capita dietary energy supply 
(DES) 
Political rights and civil liberties 
(PRCL) 
Population, total (POP) 
Primary school enrollment ratio (%) 
(PRIM) 
Secondary school enrollment (%) 
(SEC) 
Trade (% of GDP) (TRADE) 
Urban population (% of total) 
(UPOP) 
Average growth rate of the labor force (1991-1995) 
The proportion of the total labor force recorded as 
working in agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 
Military expenditure as a percentage of GNP 
Official development assistance (ODA) consists of net 
disbursements of loans and grants made on concessional 
terms by official agencies of the members of D AC and 
certain Arab countries to promote economic 
development and welfare in recipient economies listed 
as developed by D AC. Loans with a grant element of 
more that 25 percent are included in ODA. ODA also 
includes technical cooperation and assistance. Official 
aid refers to aid flows from official donors to the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union and to certain advanced developing 
countries and territories as determined by DAC. Official 
aid is provided under terms and conditions similar to 
those for ODA. 
Total cereal consumption excluding beer 
supply/cap/year (Teg) 
Total food availability estimates obtained by aggregating 
the energy or nutritive values of the food component of 
commodities available for human consumption 
See section on "Discussion of some of the model 
variables" in Chapter 5 
Based on the de facto definition of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal status or 
citizenship. Refugees not permanently settled in the 
country of asylum are generally considered to be part of 
the population of their country of origin. 
Primary school enrollment (% gross) in 1991 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) in 1991 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services. 
The midyear population of areas defined as urban in 
each country. It is measured as the percentage of the 
total population. 
World Bank* 
World Bank* 
World Bank* 
World Bank1 
FAO* 
FAOf 
Freedom 
House8 
World Bank* 
World Bank* 
World Bank* 
World Bank* 
World Bank* 
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Choice of Data Sources 
The decision to use the data sources and the variables provided in Table 5.2 was made 
after an extensive search for data. In addition to the data sources listed, data from the World 
Health Organization (WHO), United States Department of Agriculture (USD A), Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and United Nation Children's Fund (UNICEF) among others 
were considered. Table 5.3 shows the some of the data sources and variables that were 
reviewed. The decision to use the World Bank for most of the data was two-fold: (i) the 
desire to keep the data as consistent as possible in terms of country definitions, variables 
definitions, etc., and, (ii) the completeness of the data. 
Table 5.3. Data sources and variables considered 
Data Source Variable Decision 
World Bank Gini coefficient 
Poverty index 
Penn World Tables Gross Domestic Product 
WHO Prevalence of underweight 
UNICEF 
CIA World 
Factbook 
Transparency 
International 
Malnutrition 
Literacy rates, external 
debt, foreign and food aid 
Corruption perception 
index 
Data from Deininger and Squire, 
1996 was more complete 
Not available for many countries 
World Bank data available 
F AO's per capita dietary energy 
supply includes more countries 
FAO's per capita dietary energy 
supply includes more countries 
Data for different countries given for 
different years - World Bank data 
more complete. For food aid, only 
developing countries were listed. 
Corruption data was not available for 
many countries and corruption is 
incorporated in the freedom indices 
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CHAPTER 6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the impact of selected economic variables 
on the indicator of food security as measured by per capita dietary energy supply and 
discusses the implications of these results. Initially, a model with per capita dietary energy 
supply as the dependent variable, and income (GDP) per capita and the political variables as 
part of the explanatory variables on the right hand side, was estimated. However, income per 
capita was highly correlated with the political variables. Thus, the estimation is performed in 
two steps: first, a model describing the relationship between per capita income and political 
institutions was estimated and then, the regression of a model for the relationship between 
per capita income and per capita dietary energy supply was estimated. Viewed in a 
simultaneous equation context, this provides a link between per capita dietary energy supply 
and the political variables indirectly through per capita income. 
The chapter is divided into two sections: the first section provides the empirical results 
of the relationship between per capita income and the political institution variables, and the 
second section links per capita income to per capita dietary energy supply. The first section 
also provides a brief description of previous empirical studies investigating the relationship 
between income, economic growth and political institutions. Based on the results of these 
empirical studies, cross-country regressions were used to show the link between economic 
growth and a basic set of macroeconomic and political variables. In the second section, 
regression models using different explanatory variables and per capita dietary energy supply 
as the dependent variable were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for the cross-
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sectional units. Finally, two stage least squares (2SLS) is also used to address the 
endogeneity of income per capita. 
Economic Growth and Political Institutions 
Previous empirical studies on economic growth 
This section briefly describes the models and variables used in previous empirical 
studies designed to determine the relationship between economic growth and political 
institutions. Chapter 4 has discussed the findings of these studies. Using these past studies, 
the next section shows the basic model used to determine the link between income or 
economic growth and political variables. 
Scully (1988) used a simple neoclassical growth function of the form g = ek.gk 
where gy is the growth rate of the growth rate of output per head, ek is the elasticity of 
output per head with respect to the capital-labor ratio and gk is the growth rate of the capital-
labor ratio. The compound growth rate of real gross domestic product per capita for the 
period 1960 to 1980 is the dependent variable and the compound growth rate of the real 
capital-labor ratio for the same period is the explanatory variable in the model. Scully used 
population as the proxy for the labor force and he used the averages of Gastil's measures of 
political and civil liberty and economic freedom for the period 1973 to 1980 as the 
institutional variables. 
In the study by McMillan, Rausser and Johnson (1993), per capita GDP, parity 
purchasing power corrected in 1980 U.S. dollars, is the dependent variable in an aggregated 
production function model. The independent variables include the difference in the 
logarithms of the capital-to-labor ratio between the current and previous years, the difference 
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in the logarithms of population between the current and previous years and the level of real 
GDP with terms of trade adjustment. They used Gastil's political rights and civil liberties to 
measure institutional structure of the national economy. The sample covered the period from 
1972 to 1988. 
Levine and Renelt (1992) and de Haan and Strum (2000) examined the robustness of 
the coefficients of macroeconomic and institutional explanatory variables linked to economic 
growth using a variant of extreme-bounds analysis. The general form of their equation takes 
the form: 
Yi = aMi + PFt + yZi + ui 
where Yf is the average growth of per capita GDP of country z; Mi is a set of standard 
economic explanatory variables based on previous empirical studies which include initial 
level of real GDP per capita, average investment share to GDP and secondary-school 
enrollment rate in the initial year; Zf is a subset of additional economic explanatory variables 
which may be related to economic growth and these include average population growth, the 
average ratio of real government consumption to GDP, the average inflation rate and the 
average ratio of export and import to GDP; and wf is an error term. Levine and Renelt (1992) 
found that the relationship between many of the variables considered in the literature and 
economic growth was not robust. Many coefficients changed signs and/or significance when 
small changes in the conditioning set of variables (Zf) were made. 
Weede (1983) offered two alternative indicators of economic growth as the dependent 
variable: the average growth rates of GNP per capita and of GDP per capita for the period 
1960-1979. The independent variables included a measure of political democracy in 1965, 
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the initial level of income per capita in 1965, the average of gross domestic investment as a 
percentage of GDP for the 1960, 1965, 1970 and 1973 values, primary and secondary school 
enrollment ratios in 1960 and the military participation ratio in 1960. Another study 
conducted by Fosu (1992) examined an equation of the form: 
Q = a0 +alL+a2K + a3X+a4P + v 
where Q is the mean annual GDP growth rate for the period 1960 to 1986, L is the mean 
annual percent growth rate of the labor force, K is the mean annual gross domestic 
investment as a percentage of GDP, and X is the average annual growth rate of merchandise 
exports. P is a measure of political instability and v is the error term. 
Empirical Results 
Income and political institutions 
Based on the literature and the studies discussed above, and based on the available data, 
this study presents a number of models showing the relationship between the growth rate of 
per capita real GDP and macroeconomic and political variables. The dependent variable is 
the growth rate of per capita real GDP for the period between 1991 and 1995. The right-hand 
side variables are chosen from a pool of explanatory variables discussed in the various 
empirical studies. The models used in this specification are presented in this section. 
In cross-sectional studies, the OLS estimates may be inefficient due to the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. Thus, White's heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation 
was used to correct for heteroskedasticity (de Haan and Strum 2000; SHAZAM 1993). Table 
6.1 shows the alternative models and the associated empirical results. The dependent 
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variable is the growth rate of per capita real GDP (GDPGRT) is estimated using the 
following two equations: 
GDPGRTit = a0 +LABFRCitax +XGRTita2 +GINVjtas +PRCLuan +e„ (6.1a) 
GDPGRTit =a0 +GDPIita% +GDPIfta,, +GINVitas +SECita6 +PRlMi[a7 
+ AVGINFaa% + GCONitag + TRADEita}0 + PRCLuan + eit (6. lb) 
where / =1,2,. ...//"representing the number of countries and t = 1995 the period under study. 
LABFRC: the average growth rate of the labor force for the period 1991 to 1995; 
XGRT: the average of the annual growth rate of the exports for the period 1991 to 1995; 
GDPI: the initial (1991) real GDP per capita; and GDPI2: the square of GDPI\ 
GINV: the average gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP for 1991-1995; 
SEC: the secondary school enrollment ratio for 1991; 
PRIM: the primary school enrollment ratio for 1991; 
AVGINF: the average growth rate of inflation (GDP deflator) for 1991-1995; 
GCON: the average government consumption as percentage of GDP for 1991-1995; 
TRADE' the average trade (exports plus imports) as percentage of GDP for 1991-1995; 
PRCL: the index for political rights and civil liberties for 1995 where FREE denotes the 
combined political rights and civil liberties ranging between 2 and 4, PFREE (partly 
free) between 5 and 9 and NFREE (not free) between 10 and 14. 
Model (i) presents the regression results using LABFRC, XGRT, GINV and PRCL as the 
right hand-side variables and the growth rate of per capita real GDP as the dependent 
variable. GINV is used as a measure of the growth of capital. The model shows that the 
coefficients for XGRT and GINV are positive and highly significant (at 0.01 level of 
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Table 6.1. OLS regression results for the growth rate of per capita real GDP with political 
rights and civil liberties included with other explanatory variables 
Right band- Estimated Model Model Model Model Model Model 
side variable Coefficient (i) (ii) (in) (iv) (v) (vi) 
LABFRC 
XGRT 
AVGINF 
GCON 
TRADE 
PRCL: FREE 
PFREE 
CONSTANT 
a\ 
a-L 
a% 
ag 
0.11 
(0.40) 
0.20 
(3.91)* 
GDPI &3 0.00021 0.00065 0.00014 
(2.38)" (2.03)" (168)= 
GDPI2 a, -0.2E-07 
(-1-75)= 
GINV as 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.15 
(3.24)* (2.47)" (2.53)" (2.37)" 
SEC a6 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 
(-3.24)* (-3.21)* (-3.52)* 
PRIM 07 0.04 0.04 0.04 
(2.00)" (1.78)= (175)= 
0.00017 
(2.09)b 
0.10 
(2.36)" 
-0.07 
(-3.08)' 
0.04 
(1.89)= 
-0.002 
(-2.15)" 
0.00016 
(2.00)" 
0.11 
(2.88)' 
-0.07 
(-2.99)* 
0.04 
(2.18)" 
-0.002 
(-2.26)" 
-0.14 
(-3.00)* 
flio 0.03 
(3.31)* 
Oil 1.56 3.84 3.60 4.63 3.20 4.37 
(1.76)= (2.97)* (2.94)* (3.33)» (2.64)" (3.51)* 
Oil' -0.31 0.83 0.92 1.06 0.50 0.63 
(-0.41) (0.76) (0.83) (0.95) (0.48) (0.64) 
Oo -3.21 -4.30 -4.16 -5.42 -3.07 -1.91 
(-2.92)* (-2.59)" (-2.48)" (-3.11)* (-1.95) (-1.14) 
R2 0.41 0.24 0.26 0.31 0.34 0.40 
R2 0.38 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.30 0.37 
iV 112 140 140 131 140 135 
t-stati sties are in parenthesis 
* statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
" statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
c statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
d sample sizes differ between models because of missing data for some countries for different variables 
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significance) which implies that higher growth rates in capital and exports are positively 
associated with the growth rate in per capita real GDP. The coefficient for LABJFRC is 
positive but not statistically significant11. 
In terms of the political variables, the coefficient for FREE is positive and significant at 
the 0.1 probability level while the coefficient for PFREE is negative but close to zero and not 
statistically significant. The positive value of the variable FREE indicates that tihe 
conditional value of the growth rate of per capita real GDP is higher compared to NFREE 
(the left-out dummy variable to avoid the dummy variable trap). Since the coefficient for 
PFREE is almost zero, this implies that the conditional expected value of the read per capita 
GDP growth rate is essentially the same for countries that are categorized as partly free and 
not free. 
The rest of the models (ii to vi) include independent variables used in the other studies 
that have examined the relationship between economic growth and political variables 
(equation 6. lb). Model (ii) is the basic model used by Levine and Renelt (1992)-, and 
includes the initial value of real GDP per capita in 1991 (GDPI), the investment "variable 
(GINV), the initial values of both primary and secondary school enrollments for 1991 (PRIM 
and SEC) along with the political variables. The coefficients for GDPI and GINV are both 
positive and statistically significant. The PRIM coefficient is also positive and significant at 
the 0.05 significance level while the coefficient for secondary school enrollment (SEC) is 
negative and highly significant. Weede (1983) also estimated a positive coefficient for 
primary school enrollment and a positive but not a statistically significant coefficient for 
11 When the mean annual GDP growth rate is used (as in Fosu 1992) instead of the growth rate ofr per capita 
GDP, the LABFRC coefficient is positive and significant at 0.01 level of significance. The rest of the variables 
retain their sign and level of significance. 
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secondary school enrollment. When he considered only low and middle income nations, the 
coefficient for secondary school enrollment was negative but not significant. 
Model (iii) considers a curvilinear relationship between the level of income and 
economic growth and shows that the coefficient for GDPI is still positive and significant 
while the coefficient for GDPI2 is negative and significant at 0.05 significance level. The 
sign and significance of the coefficients for the rest of the variables are similar to model (ii) 
except for the PRIM coefficient which is positive and significant at the 0.1 level. 
Harrison (1996) reviews the significance of openness to trade for economic growth 
particularly in terms of the new growth theories, which suggest that trade policy has a 
positive impact on technological change and therefore on long-run growth. Openness to 
trade provides access to imported inputs (and therefore new technology) which expands the 
market for producers and increases the returns to innovation. Thus, TRADE, which measures 
the openness to trade, is added in model (iv). The coefficient for TRADE is positive and 
highly significant. 
When average inflation (AVGINF) and government consumption (GCON) are 
introduced into the model, the coefficients for GDPI, GINV and PRIM axe positive and 
statistically significant. The SEC coefficient remains negative and significant and the 
coefficients for A VGINF and GCON are also negative and statistically significant. This 
implies that inflation and government consumption are negatively correlated with economic 
growth measured in terms of the growth rate of per capita real GDP. 
The sign and significance of the estimated coefficients of the political variables are 
similar for models (ii) to (vi) with the coefficient for FREE positive and highly significant 
while the coefficient for PFREE positive but not statistically significant. For all the models, 
70 
when the coefficient for NFREE is estimated instead of PFREE, the coefficient is negative 
- and not significant. This indicates that there are basically two broad political distinctions for 
countries: those that are categorized as FREE and all other nations12. 
Levine and Renelt (1992) discussed the statistical and conceptual problems with some 
of the right-hand side variables. These included the measurement problems with the initial 
level of per capita GDP and the initial secondary-school enrollment rate, which may result in 
biased estimates13. They also discussed the poor census data for population and the 
ambiguous causal link between the dependent variable (the growth rate in per capita GDP) 
and the average annual population growth. Levine and Renelt estimated the coefficient of 
the average annual population growth and found it to be positive but not significant. For this 
reason, population growth was not included in the models provided in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.2 uses the level of per capita GDP in 1995 as the dependent variable instead of 
the growth rate in per capita GDP. In this case the independent variables are lagged one 
period such that the initial level of per capita GDP and the observations for GINV, TRADE, 
and GCON are for 1994. However, the education variables (SEC and PRIM) remain for the 
year 1991 and the political variables (FREE and PFREE) are for the 1995 period. The 
inflation rate for 1994 (INF) is used in place of AVGINF, the average growth rate of inflation 
for 1991 to 1995, which appears in Table 6.1. 
12 This primary distinction is made by Murdoch and Sandler, 1997. 
13 Mismeasurement of initial income may lead to the coefficient on initial income being biased toward being 
negative. When instnimental variables are used to control for measurement error, initial income and literacy 
rate may become insignificant (Levine and Renelt, 1992). 
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Table 6.2. OLS regression results for the level of per capita real GDP with political rights 
and civil liberties included as explanatory variables 
Righthand- Estimated Model (i) Model Model Model Model 
side variable Coefficient (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
LABFRC1 bx 1.62 
(0.58) 
XPRT bz 2.22 
(1.78)= 
GDPI bz 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 
(211.6)" (148.8)' (205.6)* (205.6)* (165.0)* 
GDPIz b4 
GINV bs 2.80 2.11 2.87 2.88 (1.81)= (1-27) (1.38) (1-38) 
SEC b6 -0.56 -0.25 0.12 0.12 
(-0.83) (-0-37) (0.18) (0.18) 
PRIM bn 0.51 
(0-76) 
INF bg 0.00046 
(0.26) 
GCON b9 -5.69 -5.76 -6.59 -6.59 
(-2.25)" (-2.47)" (-2.29)" (-2.28)" 
TRADE b\o 2.31 2.31 
(2.12)" (2.12)" 
PRCL: FREE bn 218.48 176.44 228.13 228.42 163.23 
(3.14)* (2.29)" (3.46)* (3.46)* (2.65)* 
PFREE bw 26.37 33.87 24.03 24.29 14.80 
(0.72) (0-85) (0.64) (0.64) (0.34) 
CONSTANT bo -132.11 -42.87 -33.43 -34.17 -31.57 
(-0.95) (-0.99) (-0.73) (-0-72) (-1-21) 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
R2 
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
iV 129 135 131 131 153 
t-stati sties are in parenthesis 
a statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
b statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
c statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
d sample sizes differ between models because of missing data for some countries for different variables 
As expected, the coefficient for GDPI is positive and highly significant. Since the 
dependent variable is the level of per capita real GDP in 1995 and GDPI in Table 6.2 is the 
1994 value of real GDP per capita, GDPI explains the majority of the variation in the 
dependent variable. This accounts for the extremely high R2 (almost perfect fit) in all the 
model specifications. The coefficient for GDPI is also equal to one, which indicates that the 
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models are not stable14. Nevertheless, the model is used as a gross approximation to show the 
relationship between the level of per capita real GDP and the political variables. 
The LABFRC coefficient is positive but not statistically significant while that for 
exports is positive and significant at 0.1 significance level. The coefficient for GINV is also 
positive but significant only in model (i). The coefficients for the education variables (SEC 
and PRIM) are not statistically significant. The inflation coefficient (INF) is positive, not 
statistically significant and very close to zero. The variable measuring openness to trade 
(TRADE) has a positive and significant coefficient which implies openness to trade is 
positively associated with the level of per capita income. 
The coefficient for GCON is negative and significant at the 0.05 significance level. 
This indicates that countries that allocate a larger proportion of their GDP to government 
consumption tend to suffer lower levels of per capita income. Although GDPI accounts for 
the majority of the explanatory power, the coefficients for the political variables are 
statistically significant. The variables measuring political freedoms show a positive and 
highly significant coefficient for FREE and a positive but not significant coefficient for 
PFREE. 
Per capita dietary energy supply and income 
The previous section established the relationship between the growth rate of per capita 
real GDP (and the level of per capita real GDP) and political institutions. In this section, 
income, measured in terms of per capita GDP, is linked to per capita dietary energy supply, 
which is the indicator of food security. The regression equation 6.2 is a reduced form model. 
14 When the level of per capita GDP in 1980 is used as the initial level of income in model (ii), the coefficient 
for GDPI is less than one (0.67) and the coefficient for FREE is positive and significant while that for PFREE is 
positive but not significant R2 is equal to 0.85. 
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It uses explanatory variables based on the discussion presented in Chapter 3 with respect to 
the underlying causes of food insecurity. The basic regression equation, with per capita 
dietary energy supply as the dependent variable, to be estimated is given as follows: 
DESit = 30 +AGLABit p, + UPOP.fi2 +IRRIG.fi3 +FERTCit P4 
+ FRATE.fi, +MILEXP.fi 6 + ODA.fi 7 + CEREAL.fi z (6.2) 
+ GDP.fi9 + FEMP.fi,Q +TRADE.fiu +uit 
where /= 1,2,...A'" (the number of countries) and t = 1995. 
DES: per capita dietary energy supply; 
AGLAB: labor force in agriculture as percentage of the total labor force; 
UPOP: urban population as percentage of total population; 
IRRIG: irrigated land as percentage of arable land; 
FEKTC: fertilizer consumption in 100 grams per hectare of arable land; 
FRATE: total fertility rate in number of births per woman; 
MILEXP: military expenditure as percentage of GNP; 
ODA: official development assistance and official aid converted to per capita by 
dividing by total population; 
CEREAL: cereal production in metric tons divided by total population; 
GDP: per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in purchasing power parity; 
FEMP: the female enrollment ratios in primary school as percentage of men; 
TRADE: average trade (percent of GDP) used as the measure of openness. 
Some explanatory variables are replaced by other variables in the regression equation with 
the parameters to be estimated given by % for equation (6.1). These include: 
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LIT: the total adult literacy rates for people 15 years of age and cider, which is 
substituted for FEMP\ 
POPG: the annual population growth (in percentage) which is substituted forFRATE; 
HECF: the Heritage index of economic freedom where EFREE denotes the economic 
freedom index of 1.99 or less, EMFREF, (mostly free) is the index between 2 and 2.99, 
EMNFREE (mostly not free) the index between 3 and 3.99, and ENFREE (not free) has 
a value of 4 and higher. HECF is used instead of PRCL in some model specifications. 
A detailed description of the variables was presented Table 5.2 in Chapter 5 and again 
in Table D.2 in Appendix D. First, the model is estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). The estimated equation incorporates most of the explanatory variables that have been 
used in previous studies as affecting food insecurity. In addition, the equation includes 
political variables, which are the primary interest of this study. OLS regressions on the 
cross-sectional data are performed using one year (1995). In this case the regression 
equation 6.2 will not include the subscript t which denotes the years. 
Ordinary Least Squares regression results 
Table 6.3a gives the results of various OLS regressions and the explanatory variables 
that were used with per capita dietary energy supply as the dependent variable. For all model 
specifications, the coefficient for per capita GDP (GDP) is positive and highly significant. 
This confirms the hypothesis that countries with high per capita incomes tend to enjoy higher 
levels of per capita dietary energy supply and therefore, tend to be more food secure. Low-
income developing countries usually suffer from persistent food deficits and therefore, from 
chronic food insecurity. 
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Table 6.3a. OLS regression results with per capita dietary energy supply as the dependent 
variable and the level of real per capita GDP included as an independent variable 
Righthand-
side variable 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Model Model Model Model Model Model 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)1 (v) (vi)2 
-8.21 -8.13 -8.17 -10.16 -7.50 -6.13 
(-3.79)" (-3.73)" (-3.96)* (-4.84)* (-2.67)* (-2.75)* 
0.92 
(0.40) 
-1.45 -1.33 -0.86 -1.39 -0.29 
(-1.03) (-0.96) (-0.60) (-0.98) (-0.21) 
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 
(2.49)" (2.62)* (2.89)* (2.80)* (2.49)" (2.03)" 
-108.60 -108.04 -89.70 -73. II1 -110.45 -144.31 
(-3.38)" (-3.42)* (-3.03)* (-2.15)" (-3.39)* (-3.86)* 
10.43 4.45 2.00 2.00 9.93 8.89 
(0-84) (0.34) (0.18) (0.16) (0.80) (0.72) 
1.09 1.26 1.04 1.24 1.09 0.88 
(1.96)" (2.27)" (2.07)" (2.10)" (1.96)" (1.54) 
187.50 176.70 216.23 241.91 187.11 280.55 
(1.83)c (175)= (2.32)" (2.34)" (1.82)° (2.67)" 
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
(2.98)" (3.05)* (3.42)* (2.86)* (2.91)* (3.07)* 
65.53 57.21 54.16 61.59 65.22 13.22 
(3.36)* (2.94)* (3.10)* (3.07)* (3.32)* (1-41) 
-0.49 -0.43 -0.40 -0.44 -0.48 -0.152 
(-3.73)* (-3.31)* (-3.53)* (-3-31)* (-3.70)* (2.18)" 
AGLAB 
UPOP 
IRRIG 
FERTC 
FRATE 
MILEXP 
ODA 
CEREAL 
GDP 
FEMP 
FEMP2 
TRADE 
CONSTANT 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
Ao 
A<r 
Ai 
A 
R2 
iV 
1250.6 
(178)' 
0.74 
0.71 
114 
-0.70 
(-1.01) 
1582.5 
(2.24)" 
0.75 
0.72 
113 
1523.6 1036.8 1194.5 3061.5 
(2.34)* (1.43) (166)= (8.02)* 
0.74 0.72 0.74 0.72 
0.72 0.69 0.71 0.69 
125 114 114 114 
t-statistics are in parenthesis 
s statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
b statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
e statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
d sample sizes differ between models because of missing data for some countries for different variables 
1 POPG used instead of FRATE 
2 Model (vi) uses the variable LIT instead of FEMP 
The variable AGLAB is negative and is also highly significant. The negative sign of the 
estimated coefficient of AGLAB implies that a country with higher percentages of agricultural 
labor may suffer from lower levels of per capita dietary energy supplies. The coefficient for 
UPOP, urban population, is positive but not significant (model (v)). The correlation between 
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AGLAB and UPOP is -0.84, therefore the two variables are highly correlated. Thus, the 
variable UPOP was not included in the rest of the model specifications. The variables of 
IRRIG and FERTC are used to measure investments in agriculture. The IRRIG coefficient is 
negative and not statistically significant. However, the FERTC coefficient is positive and 
significant in all model specifications. Increased consumption of fertilizer is positively 
associated with per capita dietary energy supply. 
In all the models except model (iv) FRATE, the fertility rate, is used as an explanatory 
variable. In model (iv), FRATE is replaced by POPG, the annual population growth, for 
comparison. The variable birth rate (BIRTH) was also used but did not show significant 
differences in results from FRATE. The coefficients of FRATE and POPG (model (iv)) are 
negative and significant which implies that high fertility rates and high population growth 
rates are associated with lower levels of per capita dietary energy supply. Higher cereal 
production is positively and significantly associated with per capita dietary energy supply. 
The variable measuring female literacy, FEMP, is squared since a plot of FEMP against 
per capita dietary energy supply revealed a nonlinear relationship. The coefficient of FEMP 
is positive and highly significant while that for FEMP1 is negative and significant. This 
implies that female education is positively associated with per capita dietary energy supply 
but at a decreasing rate. When total adult literacy rates are used instead of FEMP (model 
(vi)), the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. This is a puzzling result since 
higher levels of literacy are usually associated with higher levels of income and therefore, 
higher consumption of food. 
The coefficient for military expenditure is positive in some models and negative in 
others although it is not statistically significant in all cases. The coefficient of ODA, which 
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measures official aid, is positive and significant. Although the impact of development 
assistance (and food aid) on recipient countries has been strongly debated, this positive 
relationship indicates that assistance to developing countries may improve their food security 
situation. The TRADE coefficient in model (ii) is negative and not significant. 
Table 6.3b. OLS regression results for per capita dietary energy supply as the dependent 
variable and the growth rate of real per capita GDP included as an independent variable 
Righthand- Estimated Model Model Model Model Model Model 
side variable Coefficient (0 (ii) (inl (iv)1 (v) (vi)2 
AGLAB <Zi -10.82 -10.46 -10.72 -12.16 -9.65 -9.22 
(-5.51)' (-4.93)* (-5.66)* (-6.56)* (-3.57)* (-4-55)* 
UPOP a2 1 44 (0.63) 
IRRIG a3 -1.30 -0.98 -0.48 -1.19 -0.52 (-0.91) (-0.64) (-0.34) (-0.83) (-0.36) 
FERTC a4 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 (3.14)* (2.35)" (3.97)" (3.37)* (3.11)* (2.81)* 
FRATE as -104.50 -106.44 -86.20 -92.13' -107.54 -123.98 (-3.27)» (-3.20)* (-2.90)* (-2.67)* (-3.31)* (-3.25)* 
MILEXP 0% 13.99 14.46 3.01 7.38 13.15 11.54 
(1-14) (1.15) (0.27) (0.61) (106) (0.92) 
ODA a? 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.44 0.28 0.19 (0-50) (0.57) (0.61) (0.79) (0.53) (0.35) 
CEREAL as 236.34 240.23 280.88 272.86 233.80 326.97 
(2.42)" (2.41)" (3-12)" (2.79)* (2.38)" (3.15)* 
GDPGRT atg 15.20 15.57 11.51 18.20 15.12 13.11 
(3.03)' (3.04)* (3.13)* (3.45)* (3.00)* (2.41)" 
FEMP aio 62.79 63.54 54.54 59.51 62.34 4.812 
FEMP12 
(3.22)* (3.17)* (3.10)* (3.01)* (3.19)* (0.50) 
CCiff -0.46 -0.47 -0.41 -0.42 -0.46 -0.082 (-3.56)* (-3.49)* (-3.52)* (-3.23)* (-3.52)* (1-12) 
TRADE as l 0 60 (0.37) 
CONSTANT ao 1508.1 1443.4 1704.7 1291.8 1415.9 3428.0 
(2.16)" (2.00)" (2.60)* (1.83)= (1.98)" (9.13)* 
R2 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.70 
R 2  
0.71 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.68 
A4 114 111 125 114 114 114 
t-statistics are in parenthesis 
a statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
b statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
c statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
d sample sizes differ between models because of missing data for some countries for different variables 
1 POPG used instead of FRATE 
2 Model (vi) uses the variable LIT instead of FEMP 
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In Table 6.3b, the growth rate of real GDP per capita (GDPGRT) is used instead of the 
level of per capita GDP as an explanatory variable. In this case, the coefficient for GDPGRT 
is also positive and significant which implies that positive economic growth is associated 
with higher levels of caloric intake. The coefficient of AGLAB remains negative and highly 
significant. The results are also similar to those of Table 6.3a in terms of the sign and 
significance for the UPOP, IRRIG, FERTC, FRATE, CEREAL and FEMP coefficients. The 
coefficient for MLLEXP is positive but not significant. Although the coefficient for ODA is 
negative for some specifications of the model and positive in others, it is not significant. The 
TRADE coefficient is positive but also not statistically significant. 
Table 6.4 presents the initial model specification where both per capita GDP and the 
political variables were included in the OLS regression. The results show that the GDP 
coefficient remains positive and significant. However, the coefficients for FREE and PFREE 
are negative and not statistically significant for most model specifications. When GDP is 
removed from the model (acknowledging the specification or omitted variable bias), the 
political variable coefficients have the expected sign (i.e., become positive) and the 
coefficient for FREE becomes statistically significant. This is an indication that per capita 
income (GDP) and the freedom variables are highly correlated. 
The results for the rest of the variables are similar to those presented in Table 6.3a. The 
coefficients for AGLAB and FRATE are negative and significant while the coefficients for 
CEREAL and FERTC are positive and significant for all model specifications. The 
coefficients for IRRIG, MILEXP and TRADE are negative and not statistically significant. 
Official development assistance (ODA) continues to be positive and significant. 
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Table 6.4. OLS regression results for per capita dietary energy supply as the dependent 
variable and both real per capita GDP and the political variables as independent variables 
Right hand- Estimated Model Model Model Model (iv) Model Model 
side variable Coefficient (i) (ii) (iii)1 (v) (vi)2 
AGLAB n -8.32 -8.29 -10.32 -7.68 -8.36 -6.72 (-3.85)' (-4.01)' (-4.91)* (-2.73)' (-3.85)' (-3.04)' 
UPOP n 0.83 (0.36) 
IRRIG n -1.85 -1.22 -1.80 -1.74 -0.95 (-1-31) (-0.84) (-1-26) (-1.25) (-0.67) 
FERTC X 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 (2.53)b (2.86)' (2.85)' (2.52)b (2.71)' (2.12)b 
FRATE n -112.90 -89.07 -76.35' -114.30 -110.96 -148.08 (-3.44)' (-2.96)' (-2.13)b (-3.45)' (-3.44)' (-4.00)* 
MILEXP Ye 4.28 -3.41 -4.01 3.89 -1.33 2.45 (0.33) (-0.28) (-0-31) (0.30) (-0.10) (0.19) 
ODA r* 1.25 1.08 1.40 1.24 1.41 0.97 (2.07)b (2.00)b (2.13)b (2.04)b (2.36)b (1.56) 
CEREAL ft 188.94 216.76 244.90 188.55 178.42 269.08 (1.85)= (2.32)b (2.37)b (1.84)= (1-78)= (2.60)' 
GDP % 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 (2.67)' (2.84)' (2.5 l)b (2.57)' (2.64)* (2.53)b 
FEMP no 59.17 49.97 55.76 58.84 51.27 10.362 
FEMP2-
(2.90)' (2.72)' (2.65)' (2.87)' (2.53) (1-07) 
n<y -0.44 -0.38 -0.40 -0.44 -0.39 -0.13 
(-3.28)' (-3.13)' (-2.89)' (-3.25)' (-2.90)' (-1.86)= 
TRADE m -0.84 (-1.21) 
PRCL: FREE -112.90 -50.79 -106.07 -108.63 -102.47 -93.56 
(-1.05) (-0.53) (-0.94) (-1.00) (-0.97)) (-0-84) 
PFREE nz -106.23 -83.85 -97.33 -106.95 -102.18 -148.84 (1-50) (-1.25) (-1.33) (-1.50) (-1.46) (-2.12)b 
CONSTANT x> 1585.2 1738.5 1332.2 1535.0 1907.8 3321.9 (2.11)b (2.48)b (1.72)= (2.00)b (2.53)" (8.25)* 
R2 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.73 
R2 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.70 
V 113 124 113 113 112 113 
(-statistics are in parenthesis 
* statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
b statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
c statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
d sample sizes differ between models because of missing data for some countries for different variables 
1 POPG used instead of FRATE 
2 Model (vi) uses the variable LIT instead of FEMP 
80 
Additional variables were used in the model specifications represented in Tables 6.1 to 
6.4. These included the total external debt per capita (EDEBT), the Gini coefficient, which 
measures income inequality, and the Heritage economic freedom variables. The coefficients 
for both EDEBT and GINI were negative and not statistically significant. The OLS 
regression results for DES using the Heritage economic freedom variables EFREE, EMFREE 
and EMNFREE (with ENFREE as the omitted variable) in place of the political freedom 
variable (PRCL) found that the coefficients had the expected sign (positive for EFREE and 
EMFREE and negative for EMNFREE). However, the coefficients were not significant. 
Table E.l in Appendix E shows the regression results for per capita dietary energy 
supply when only countries consuming less than 2500 kilocalories per person per day are 
included. The results remain the same for the coefficients of AGLAB, CEREAL and GDP. 
Most of the variables, however, lose their significance. The only exception is MIT.EXP. In 
this case, the coefficient for MILEXP is negative and statistically significant. This points to 
the high military expenditure of many developing countries, probably at the expense of 
programs that could alleviate food deficiencies. 
Several model specifications using country partitions were also performed to examine 
the results based on certain characteristics in an attempt to explain the sign (and/or 
significance level) of the variables IRRIG and AGLAB. Therefore, countries were partitioned 
into those which consistently used high irrigation for the past 20 years and those where 
irrigation usage was low. Partitions were also made for countries with a high agricultural 
labor force and those with low percentages of the labor force in agriculture. These 
specifications did not yield any significant results and did not change the sign and 
significance of the irrigation and agricultural labor variables. 
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It is important to point out that regression results do not prove causality even if they are 
statistically significant. Regression analysis merely tests whether there is a significant 
quantitative relationship and the strength and direction of that relationship. Cause-and effect 
relationships are often very subtle. In order to determine causality, economic theory and 
common sense must be considered in the analysis (Studenmund 1997). 
Two-stage Least Squares regression results 
One of the classical assumptions in linear regression models is that the explanatory 
variables are non-stochastic or fixed in repeated samples and therefore, not correlated with 
the disturbances. If this assumption is violated, OLS is biased and inconsistent (Baltagi 
1998). Endogeneity may exist because some explanatory variables are determined 
simultaneously with the dependent variable. To control for endogeneity, two-stage least 
squares regression is performed. In the model represented by equation 6.2, GDP is 
considered to be endogenous. Although, having low levels of income are likely to lead to 
low dietary energy supply, low dietary energy supply may result in low income (GDP). 
Table 6.5 shows the two-stage least squares result using per capita dietary energy 
supply as the dependent variable and using the same explanatory variables as Table 6.3a. 
with predicted values of GDP from model (v) in Table 6.2. Two-stage least squares is also 
estimated using the SHAZAM statistical program which provides estimates for the right 
hand-side endogenous variable, GDP, with AGLAB, IRRIG, FERT, MILEXP, ODA, FRATE, 
CEREAL and FEMP as the exogenous variables and per capita dietary energy supply as the 
left hand-side endogenous variable (Table E.2 in Appendix E). 
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Table 6.5. 2SLS regression results for per capita dietary energy supply as the dependent 
variable 
Right hand- Estimated Model Model Model Model Model Model 
side variable Coefficient CO (ii) (iii) (iv)' (v) (vi)2 
AGLAB 5y -8.33 -8.34 -7.65 -10.40 -8.31 -6.18 
(-3.78)* (-3.99)* (-2.70)* (-4-87)* (-3.74)* (-2.73)* 
UPOP r 0 91 Ot 
(0.39) 
IRRIG 6 -1.59 -1.54 -1.04 -1.48 -0.39 (-1.13) (-1.08) (-0.71) (-1.07) (-0.28) 
FERTC 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.0T 0.05 
(2.60)* (3.00)* (2.59)* (2.91)* (2.75)* (2.11)b 
FRATE -106.78 -86.93 -108.44 -67.79' -105.75 -145.32 
(-3.30)* (-2.90)* (-3.30)* (-1.96)= (-3.32)* (-3.87)* 
MILEXP & 9.45 0.81 8.88 0.88 3.26 7.57 (0.76) (0.07) (0.70) (0.07) (0.26) (0.60) 
ODA St 1.05 0.99 1.05 1.17 1.22 0.84 (1.86)= (1.95)= (1-84)= (1.94)= (2.19)b (1.44) 
CEREAL 4 186.65 217.45 186.95 243.60 176.07 281.12 (1.8 l)c (2.3 3)b (1.81)= (2.34)b (1-74)= (2.66)' 
GDP <s> 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
(2.77)* (3.19)* (2.68)* (2.59)* (2.80)* (2.90)* 
FEMP So 67.63 55.97 67.30 63.56 59.19 14.25= (3-44)* (3.17)* (3.40)* (3.14)* (3.02)* (1.52) 
FEMP <5jcr -0.50 -0.42 -0.50 -0.45 -0.44 -0.16 
(-3.81)* (-3.60)* (-3.78)* (-3.39)* (-3.40)* (-2.30)* 
TRADE -0.78 Oil 
(-1*11) 
CONSTANT So 1188.3 1465.3 1135.2 987.75 1531.0 3061.7 (168)= (2.24)b (1.57) (1.36) (2.16)b (8.00)* 
R2 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.75 0.72 
p 2  0.71 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.72 0.69 K 
N° 112 123 112 112 111 112 
t-statistics are in parenthesis 
a statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
b statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
c statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
d sample sizes differ between models because of missing data for some countries for different variables 
1 POPG used instead of FRATE 
2 LIT used instead of FEMP 
The two-stage least squares results show that the GDP coefficient is positive and highly 
significant. The coefficient for AGLAB is negative and significant in all model 
specifications. The coefficient for IRRIG is negative and not significant while the FERTC 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient for official development 
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assistance (ODA) is positive and significant The sign of the coefficient for cereal production 
is positive and significant. 
The coefficient for FRATE is negative and highly significant. When POPG is used 
instead of FRATE, the coefficient remains negative and significant but at 0.1 significance 
level. The coefficient for MILEXP is positive but it is not statistically significant. The 
TRADE coefficient is also not significant. The FEMP coefficient is positive and highly 
significant while the coefficient for FEMP is negative and also significant at 0.01 
significance level. However, when literacy rates are used in place of FEMP, the coefficient 
is positive but no longer significant. The squared term for LIT is negative and significant. 
CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Global food production is rising and it is increasing faster than population growth. 
However, it is evident that in many countries in the developing world, food consumption 
exceeds food production. Increases in global consumption of major food commodities have 
generally outpaced increases in yields for the past two decades. Thus, most of these 
countries are net importers of food. There is also an uneven distribution of food among and 
within countries. 
Historical data indicate that the "availability gaps" among the regions of the developing 
world have become more pronounced, particularly in terms of food and nutrition. The data 
show that sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (South Asia in particular) are the two regions in the 
developing world that have the world's poorest populations and the highest proportion of 
undernourished people. In both sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the proportion of 
undernourished increased during the past two decades. This is a clear indication that things 
are getting worse for a large segment of the developing world's population. Unless 
appropriate policies are implemented, poverty will continue to rise, mostly in the African 
continent, but especially in sub-Saharan Africa, and a global food crisis may be inevitable. 
The number of undernourished is expected to increase to 184 million in sub-Saharan 
Africa by 2015 (FAO 2000). Unlike Asia, where higher consumption will be covered by an 
increase in imports, the African region will not be able to meet food needs through higher 
imports. To meet the expected rise in food requirements, sub-Saharan Africa will need to 
increase agricultural production from the current 2 percent per annum (during 1970 to 1990) 
to 4 percent per annum for the next 20 years (USDA 1996). Furthermore, because of 
85 
reductions in assistance programs, food aid is not expected to fill the gap. The situation in 
Latin America, although critical in some areas, is expected to improve as food production 
exceeds population growth rates in the future. 
There are differing hypotheses on why a majority of people in many developing nations 
face food security problems. Poverty, high population growth rates, urbanization, 
inappropriate national and economic policies, low agricultural productivity, and low 
investments in agricultural research and development are among the major reasons. The 
impact of food aid on the food situation in many of the developing countries has also been 
debated. Political rights and civil liberties as well as political instability have now become 
more important in discussions of solutions to the food security problems in the developing 
world. It is safe to suggest that a combination of all of these factors has contributed to the 
deteriorating food security situation in many countries. However, the debate continues on 
the priority given to, and the extent of, the effects of each of these factors in the food balance 
equation. 
The primary purpose of this study was to examine whether the structure of political 
institutions in developing countries has had an impact on the level of food security or 
insecurity that these countries experience. The findings of the study indicate that in general, 
political institutions, measured in terms of political rights and civil liberties, have a definite 
impact on food security which was measured primarily in terms of per capita dietary energy 
supply. However, this impact comes indirectly through income as measured in terms of per 
capita GDP. Countries with freer political systems tend to enjoy greater incomes and in turn, 
greater food security than countries with less free systems. 
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The results also reveal that countries that have larger populations of agricultural labor 
tend to suffer from food insecurity. Investments in agriculture through applications of 
fertilizer have a positive effect on per capita dietary energy supply although the irrigation 
variable was negative and not significant. 
High population growth and high fertility rates negatively impact per capita dietary 
energy supply. The results also show that higher per capita production of cereal positively 
impact per capita dietary energy supply. Official development assistance does seem to 
positively impact food security. The female literacy rate has a positive coefficient and so is 
positively correlated with per capita dietary energy supply. This implies that investments in 
education, and particularly female education, has a positive impact on food security. 
Implications of the Study 
Food-deficit developing countries must make drastic policy changes in order to solve 
the problems of food availability and food access. Governments in developing countries 
must address food problems through policies that lead to economic growth that is also 
targeted toward poverty reduction; lower population growth rates; increased investment for 
agricultural research and development; higher investments in human capital through 
education and better health and sanitation services; increased employment opportunities and 
access to credit; and better infrastructure. Increases in food production are important to 
reduce domestic imbalances, but increased incomes for the poor are the real key to food 
security. These issues must be addressed within the framework of countries' political 
structures. 
The results of this study indicate that the structure of political institutions in developing 
countries is an important but complex factor when determining the policies required to 
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eliminate jfood insecurity. It appears that high-incomc countries tend to have higher per 
capita dietary energy supply and thus enjoy food security. These high-income countries have 
freer political systems. The coefficient for partly free countries was not significant. For 
developing countries, policies that target economic sectors and aim to alleviate food 
insecurity are critical, regardless of their political structures. The official development aid 
given to developing countries clearly has a positive impact. Aid is positively correlated with 
per capita -dietary energy supply. This implies that official development assistance tends to 
improve chronic food insecurity in recipient countries. This finding has significant policy 
implications although donor countries may need to re-evaluate the conditions under which 
foreign aid! is given to developing countries. 
Although the results have shed some light on the importance of political institutions in 
determining policies related to economic growth and food security, this study is primarily an 
empirical examination of the data. Detailed research is needed and more data is required to 
examine individual countries and regions. The transition economies are of a particular 
interest since they fall into a category between developed and developing countries. A more 
detailed study of the Asian economies may also present alternative hypotheses as to the 
importance: of the type of political institutions. A closer examination of the measurement of 
political institutions is also required since a distinction should be made between the 
measurements of the quality of institutions and measurements of the political and social 
characteristics and political instability (Aron 2000). With more empirical evidence and 
establishment of stylized facts, theoretical models can then be constructed to explain the 
relationship between food security and political institutions. 
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APPENDIX A. CHECKLIST FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
Political rights checklist: 
1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through 
free and fair elections? 
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling and honest 
tabulation of ballots? 
4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power? 
5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive 
political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these 
competing parties or groupings? 
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility 
for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? 
7. Does the country have the right of self-determination, and are its citizens free from 
domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, 
economic oligarchies or any other powerful group? 
8. Is political power decentralized, allowing for local, regional and/or provincial or state 
administrations led by their freely elected officials? 
Civil liberties checklist 
1. Are there free and independent media, literature and other cultural expressions? 
2. Is there open public discussion and free private discussion? 
3. Is there freedom of assembly and demonstration? 
4. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? 
5. Are citizens equal under the law, with access to an independent, nondiscriminatory 
judiciary, and are they respected by the security forces? 
6. Is there protection from political terror, and from unjustified imprisonment, exile or 
torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system, and freedom from war or 
insurgency situations? 
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7. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there 
effective collective bargaining? 
8. Are there free professional and other private organizations? 
9. Are there free businesses or cooperatives? 
10. Are there free religious institutions and free private and public religious expressions? 
11. Are there personal social freedoms, which include such aspects as gender equality, 
property rights, freedom of movement, choice of residence, and choice of marriage and 
size of family? 
12. Is there equality of opportunity, which includes freedom from exploitation by or 
dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats or any other type of 
denigrating obstacle to a share of legitimate economic gains? 
13. Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption? 
Source: Ryan 1995, 673-674. 
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APPENDIX B. ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE HERITAGE HOUSE INDEX OF 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
Economic factors used in the measurement of the index of economic freedom include: 
Trade policy : average tariff rate, non-tariff barriers (such as import bans and quotas, strict 
labeling and licensing requirements, and burdensome health, safety, and environmental 
regulations), corruption in the customs services; 
Taxation: top income tax rate, tax rate that applies to the average income level, top corporate 
tax rate, other taxes such as capital gains, value-added, and payroll taxes; 
Government intervention in the economy : government consumption as a percentage of the 
economy, government ownership of businesses and industries, economic output produced by 
the government; 
Monetary policy: average inflation rate from 1985 to 1995; 
Capital flows and foreign investment policy : foreign investment code, restrictions on foreign 
ownership of business, restrictions on the industries and companies open to foreign investors, 
restrictions and performance requirements on foreign companies, foreign ownership of land, 
equal treatment under the law for both foreign and domestic companies, restrictions on the 
repatriation of earnings, availability of local financing for foreign companies; 
Banking-, government ownership of banks; restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to open 
branches and subsidiaries; government influence over the allocation of credit; government 
regulations, such as deposit insurance; freedom to offer all types of financial services, such as 
buying and selling real estate, securities, and insurance policies; 
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Wages and price controls' minimum wage laws; freedom to set prices privately without 
government influence; government price controls; the extent to which government price 
controls are used; government subsidies to businesses that affect prices; 
Property rights: freedom from government influence over the judicial system; commercial 
code defining contracts; sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes; government 
expropriation of property; corruption within the judiciary; delays in receiving judicial 
decisions; legally granted and protected private property; 
Regulation -, licensing requirements to operate a business; ease of obtaining a business 
license; corruption within the bureaucracy; labor regulations, such as established work 
weeks, paid vacations, and maternity leave, as well as selected labor regulations; 
environmental, consumer safety, and worker health regulations; regulations that impose a 
burden on business; 
Black market: smuggling; piracy of intellectual property in the black market; agricultural 
production supplied on the black market; manufacturing supplied on the black market; 
services supplied on the black market; transportation supplied on the black market; labor 
supplied on the black market. 
Source: Johnson, Holmes and Kirkpatrick 1998. 
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APPENDIX C. INDICATORS IN THE FREEDOM HOUSE INDEX OF ECONOMIC 
FREEDOM 
Indicators used in the measurement of the Freedom House index of economic freedom: 
Freedom to hold properly. Is the right to property recognized by law? Is the right to 
intellectual property protected? Does the legal system give effect to the right to property? 
Are there restrictions on selling, exchanging, or devising property? Can individuals structure 
their property holdings among themselves as they choose? 
Freedom to earn a living: Can individuals form voluntary associations to bargain over 
wages? Are unions state-controlled? Are wages controlled or freely set? Can individuals 
change jobs freely? Are there any vestiges of indentured servitude, debt peonage, or slavery? 
Freedom to operate a business: Can individuals freely join together to pursue mutual 
economic interests? Are the rules governing the formation of business enterprises so 
complex that large sectors of the population are foreclosed from forming businesses? Is 
entry into certain lines of commerce restricted? Are government contracts competitively let? 
Are raw materials, finished goods, services or other prices controlled? 
Freedom to invest one's earnings: Are interest rates regulated? Is credit allocated by the 
market or by government fiat? Are rates of return on investments controlled? Can 
individuals invest abroad? Can they hold foreign currency and securities? Is there an 
independent central bank or other institutional mechanism to protect citizens' savings loss 
through inflation? 
Freedom to trade internationally: Are there restrictive tariffs, quotas, or other barriers to 
importing goods from abroad? Are there export taxes or other impediments on the right to 
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sell to foreigners? Are there limits on the right to enter or leave the country? Is foreign 
investment regulated? Are there exchange controls? 
Freedom to participate in the market economy : Are racial or ethnic minorities or women 
foreclosed from certain occupations or from running certain types of businesses? Are there 
limits on minorities' or women's rights to hold or transfer property? Are the laws necessary 
for a market economy to function enforced? Is corruption so widespread as to interfere with 
normal market forces? 
Source: Messick, 1996, 7 
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APPENDIX D. DESCRIPTION OF REGRESSION VARIABLES AND DATA 
INFORMATION 
Table D.l. Descriptive statistics of variables 
NAME N MEAN STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
VARIANCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
AGLAB 173 37.638 28.276 799.51 0.3675 94.115 
AVGINF 163 196.93 898.41 8.07E+05 -1.996 8263.7 
BIRTH 195 25.503 11.67 136.19 7.9 50.58 
CEREAL 171 0.24504 0.31749 0.1008 0 1.9826 
EDEBT 137 796.36 708.52 5.02E+05 12.411 3745 
FEMP 165 91.2 14.306 204.67 40 112 
FERTC 176 1982.8 5073.8 2.57E+07 0 52000 
FRATE 193 3.414 1.7258 2.9783 1.16 7.4 
GCON 150 0.19706 9.92E-02 9.84E-03 1.99E-02 0.61994 
GCON1994 157 18.994 9.9443 98.889 2.363 60.698 
GDP 157 5579.9 5693.9 3.24E+07 361.46 24031 
GDP1980 156 5299.9 5960 3.55E+07 239.3 43622 
GDP1991 158 5203.7 5063.0 0.25634E+08 325.56 20292 
GDP1994 157 5429.2 5550.2 3.08E+07 349.3 23293 
GDPGRT 159 0.44454 5.1337 26.355 -22.52 18.913 
GINI 119 40.265 9.7121 94.325 20.5 62.3 
GINV 172 23.085 10.302 106.13 5.1043 84.619 
GBSTV94 169 22.704 11.411 130.2 0 85.042 
HECF 153 3.249 0.79308 0.62898 1.25 5 
INF 170 333.81 2211.2 4.89E+06 -3.0225 26791 
IRRIG 155 20.611 25.568 653.72 0.13235 150 
LABFRC 175 2.0074 1.2524 1.5686 -2.2952 5.4511 
LABFRC1 175 44.357 6.8469 46.88 24.814 63.986 
LIT 167 77.257 22.874 523.24 14 100 
MILEXP 153 3.1739 3.3729 11.377 0 28.6 
ODA 193 72.354 231.79 53727 -254.66 2004.1 
POP 209 2.74E+07 1.10E+08 1.21E+16 17000 1.22E+09 
PRCL 206 7.0485 4.1293 17.051 2 14 
PRIM 167 93.467 22.23 494.18 23 142 
SEC 176 54.682 32.108 1030.9 4 120 
TRADE 154 33.957 36.805 1354.6 3.9471 282.21 
TRADE94 153 33.41 37.292 1390.7 3.906 297.67 
UPOP 194 53.26 23.539 554.08 5.8 100 
XGRT 119 5.9954 6.475 41.926 -17.632 27.921 
XPRT 171 38.117 25.193 634.71 1.1423 183.13 
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Table D.2. Definition and source of variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Arable land (hectares per person) 
(LAND) 
Cereal production (metric tons) 
(CEREAL) 
Economic freedom (HECF) 
Export growth (%) ÇCGRT) 
External debt (EDEBT) 
Female enrollment (FEMF) 
Fertility rate, total (births per 
woman) (FRATE) 
Fertilizer consumption (100 grams 
per hectare of arable land) (FERTC) 
GDP growth (%) (GDPGRT) 
Gini Coefficient (GINT) 
Government consumption (% of 
GDP) (GCON) 
Gross domestic investment (% of 
GDP) (GINV) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita, PPP 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of 
people 15+) (LIT) 
Inflation (average rate) (A VGINF) 
Irrigated land (% of arable land) 
(1RR1G) 
Land under temporary crops, temporary meadows for 
mowing or pasture, and land under market and kitchen 
gardens. 
Cereals include wheat, rice, maize, barley, oats, rye, 
millet, sorghum, buckwheat, and mixed grains. 
Production data on cereals relate to crops harvested for 
dry grain only. They exclude cereal crops harvested for 
hay or harvested green for food, feed, or silage and those 
used for grazing. 
See section on "Discussion of some of the model 
variables" in Chapter 5 
Average growth of export of goods and services (1991-
1995). Exports of goods and services represent the value 
of all goods and other market services provided to the 
world. Included is the value of merchandise and non-
factor services. 
Total external debt per capita in current US dollars 
Female enrollment ratios in primary school as a 
percentage of men 
Represents the number of children that would be born to 
a woman if she were to live to the end of her 
childbearing years and bear children in accordance with 
prevailing age-specific fertility rates. 
The quantity of plant nutrients used per unit of arable 
land. Fertilizer products cover nitrogenous, potash, and 
phosphate fertilizers (including ground rock phosphate). 
The time reference for fertilizer consumption is the crop 
year. 
Average growth rate of real GDP per capita (constant 
1987 US dollars) 1991-1995 
Measures inequality in the distribution of income 
General government consumption (1991-1995) 
Average gross domestic investment as a percentage of 
GDP (1991-1995) 
Gross National Product (GNP), purchasing power parity, 
current international prices 
The proportion of adults aged 15 and older who are 
literate 
Average growth rate of GDP deflator (1987=100) (1991-
1995) 
The area purposely provided with water, including land 
irrigated by controlled flooding. 
World Bank1 
World Bank" 
Heritage 
Foundation1* 
World Bank8 
World Bank3 
World 
Resource 
Institute6 
World Bank8 
World Bank8 
World Bank8 
Deininger 
and Squired 
World Bank8 
World Bank8 
World Bank8 
World Bank8 
World Bank8 
World Bank8 
Source: 81998 World Development Indicators CD-ROM, The World Bank (World Bank 1998);b 1999 Index of 
Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation (Johnson, Bryan T., Kim R. Holmes and Melanie Kirkpatrick 
1998);c World Resources Database 1996-97;d Deininger and Squire 1996;e UNESCO Statistics Database 
1999; f The Sixth World Food Survey, FAO (FAO 1996);8 World Survey of Economic Freedom, The Freedom 
House (Messick 1998);h United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Services, 1998. 
96 
Table D.2. (continued) 
Variable Definition Source 
Labor force growth (%) (LABFRC) 
Labor force in agriculture (%) 
CAGLAB) 
Military expenditure (% of GNP) 
(M1LEXP) 
Official development assistance and 
official aid (USS) (ODA) 
Per capita dietary energy supply 
(PES) 
Political rights and civil liberties 
(PRCL) 
Population, total (POP) 
Primary school enrollment ratio (%) 
(PRIM) 
Secondary school enrollment (%) 
(SEC) 
Trade (% of GDP) (TRADE) 
Urban population (% of total) 
(UPOP) 
Average growth rate of the labor force (1991-1995) 
The proportion of the total labor force recorded as 
working in agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 
Military expenditure as a percentage of GNP 
Official development assistance (ODA) consists of net 
disbursements of loans and grants made on concessional 
terms by official agencies of the members ofDAC and 
certain Arab countries to promote economic 
development and welfare in recipient economies listed 
as developed by DAC. Loans with a grant element of 
more that 25 percent are included in ODA. ODA also 
includes technical cooperation and assistance. Official 
aid refers to aid flows from official donors to the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union and to certain advanced developing 
countries and territories as determined by DAC. Official 
aid is provided under terms and conditions similar to 
those for ODA. 
Total food availability estimates obtained by aggregating 
the energy or nutritive values of the food component of 
commodities available for human consumption 
See section on "Discussion of some of the model 
variables" in Chapter 5 
Based on the de facto definition of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal status or 
citizenship. Refugees not permanently settled in the 
country of asylum are generally considered to be part of 
the population of their country of origin. 
Primary school enrollment (% gross) in 1991 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross) in 1991 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services. 
The midyear population of areas defined as urban in 
each country. It is measured as the percentage of the 
total population. 
World Bank® 
World Bank" 
World Bank" 
World Bank1 
FAO 
Freedom 
House8 
World Bank1 
World Bank1 
World Bank1 
World Bank1 
World Bank1 
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Table D.3. World Bank data information 
Data Information 
Data for China do not include Taiwan or Hong Kong. 
Data for the former Czechoslovakia are for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic 
after 1991. 
Prior to 1992, data for Ethiopia includes Eritrea for EDEBT. 
Germany refers to unified Germany. 
Data for Jordan refers to the East Bank only. 
For the Soviet Union, data after 1991 is for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
Data for the Republic of Yemen prior to 1990 is for the former People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen and the former Yemen Arab Republic. 
Data for Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is for Serbia/Montenegro. Data for individual 
countries of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and 
Slovenia) are provided after 1990. 
Data for Belgium includes Luxembourg for LAND. 
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APPENDIX E. ADDITIONAL REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
Table E.l. OLS Regression results for per capita dietary energy supply as the dependent 
variable for countries where PES is less than 2500 kilocalories per person per day 
Righthand-
side variable 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
Model 
(i) 
Model 
(ii) 
Model 
(iu)1 
AGLAB A, -3.26 -3.35 -3.79 (-185)= (-1.99)= (-2.3 6)b 
UPOP Xz 
IRRIG X} 1.38 1.94 
(0.97) (1.42) 
FERTC A* 0.07 0.07 0.07 
(1.32) (1.55) (1-33) 
FRATE 4s 26.73 2.76 74.24' (0.91) (0-10) (2.24)b 
MfLEXP -26.18 -20.18 -27.28 
(-2.42)b (-2.00)b (2.71)* 
ODA Xj 0.86 0.94 0.91 
(0.83) (1.16) (0.94) 
CEREAL Ag 414.13 367.19 442.83 (1.71)= (1.76)= (2.00)b 
GDP Àg 0.04 0.03 0.04 (1.96)= (1.78)= (2.05)b 
FEMP Ajo -11.63 -7.37 -7.52 
(-0.84) (-0.62) (-0.58) 
FEMP2 Aio• 0.06 0.02 0.03 
(0.61) (0.32) (0.30) 
CONSTANT Ac 2666.1 2697.6 2525.5 
(5.51)" (6.38)" (5.48)" 
R2 0.55 0.50 0.60 
0.42 0.38 0.49 K 
N* 45 49 45 
t-statistics are in parenthesis 
* statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
b statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
c statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
d sample sizes differ between models because of missing data for some countries for different variables 
1 POPG used instead of FRATE 
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Table E.2. Conventional 2SLS regression results for per capita dietary energy supply as the 
dependent variable 
Right hand- Estimated Model Model Model 
side variable Coefficient (0 (ii) (iii)1 
AGLAB -7.69 -7.69 -7.68 
(-3.41)' (-3-42)' (-3.41)' 
UPOP *z 
IRRIG *3 -1.23 -0.33 (-0.68) (-0.17) 
FERTC Xk 0.06 0.05 0.07 
(2.14)" (2.08)" (2.55)" 
FRATE -119.54 -115.18 -157.71 
(-3.46)' (-3-41)' (-3.30)' 
MJLEXP 7.29 4.49 1.81 
(0.56) (0.36) (0.14) 
ODA m 1.08 i l l  1.52 (186)= (1.94)= (2.41)" 
CEREAL Jh 158.70 164.09 192.46 (1.75)= (1.84)= (1.71)= 
GDP it} 0.03 0.03 0.03 
(2.67)' (2.82)' (2.62)' 
FEMP 71io 59.15 59.07 55.76 
FEMF* 
(2.94)' (2.95)' (2.66)' 
^10" -0.44 -0.44 -0.40 (-3.31)' (-3.30)' (-2.88)' 
CONSTANT *Q 1513.6 1473.3 1269.0 
(2.10)" (2.05)" (1.68)= 
R2 0.74 0.73 0.71 
p2 0.71 0.71 0.68 K. 
N 103 103 103 
t-statistics are in parenthesis 
a statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
b statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
c statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
1 POPG used instead of FRATE 
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